1) I picked up a peirush on the megillah by Rav Yonason Eibshutz and it has some interesting he'oros. (It actually is just a likut of what he wrote in Ya'aros D'vash put together on the megillah).
He explains why it seems Achashveirosh made 2 parties. One in the 3rd year of his reign and another one 180 days later. He writes that Achashveirosh was counting 70 years until the golus was over and when the geulah didn't come he made a party. However, Achashveirosh wasn't sure if the years followed the Malchei Yehuda which is from Nisan or the non Jewish kings which is from Tishrei. When Tishrei of the 70th year came he started his party., however he was still wary that teh geulah would come in Nisan. 180 days later when Nisan came and there was no geulah, he figured it would never come. He got bolder and made a second party andthis time told Vashti to drop everything (pun intended) and come to the party.
One final point, Achashveirosh was still mesupak if Adar would be m'ubar. Therefore he asked the "yodei ha'ittim" who were the Sanhedrin who decided when to make an extra month.
2) The sefer Yosef Lekach has an interesting pshat why Esther insisted Achashveirosh come to a party right away. He writes that she didn't want to give Achashveirosh a chance to request that she sleep with him. She knew if she got him over to her palace he wouldn't make such a request. Therefore, she asked for the party right away. As far as the second party he says that Esther realized that Achashveirosh wanted her to drink with him. However, she was still fasting. She told him to come to a second party and she would drink with him there.
Thursday, March 01, 2007
Wednesday, February 21, 2007
Esther and the Jews
I noticed an interesting comment in the Shelah yesterday. The Shelah writes that Esther purposely misled the Jews into thinking that she was on Haman's side. This way they wouldn't think to rely on her, but rather they would daven to Hashem. The Shelah's m'kor for this is the gemara in Megilah that asks why did Esther invite Haman to a party. One answer given is so that people would think she was on Haman's side.
I then started wondering, did the Jewish people know that Esther was Jewish. I always assumed they did, for after all Esther was part of the community and people knew what she looked like. Presumably, everyone either saw the queen or a picture of the queen and knew what the queen looked like. So it stands to reason that those in the Jewish community knew who the queen really was. Also, even if someone wasn't 100% sure, Mordechai was hanging out by the palace every day. What was his connection to the queen? If you put two and two together it s not a big jump to realize the queen was Jewish.
However, if that is true and every Jew knew thequeen was Jewish, how did she keep it a secret? There must have been someone out there who would spill the beans (even though this was before the days of blogs). I guess you could say that since everyone thought she came from them, noone would have believed a Jew that said the queen was Jewish. The idea was so far fetched and preposterous that it wouldn't really be believable. If this is correct, then this adds to the Shelah's comment. The Jews thought they had an ace in the hole because the queen was Jewish. Therefore, Esther had to pretend she had turned to the "dark side" in order to get the Jews to put their faith in the one who really counts-HKBH.
There is of course the possibility that the Jews didn't know Esther was Jewish. The reason Mordechai hung out at the palace was because he had taken up the well known art of shtadlanus in order to help his people. From an outsiders perspective he had done a pretty good job and managed to create a close friendship with the queen. The Jews might have thought that with Mordechai as the queen's confidant they had a good chance of defeating Haman. Esther was worried they would place to much trust in this so she created the impression taht she was friendly with Haman. Now the Jews had to turn to HKBH to help them.
I am not sure which scenario is correct. It could be I am missing an obvious proof to either side. However, anyway you slice it I find the dynamics that were going on at the time very fascinating. We tend to focus on Purim as a story of a nes nistar and Hashem saving us (as well as we should as that is our job as Ovdei Hashem) but I also find it interesting viewing Purim through the eyes of someone living through the events as they happened, someone who doesn't realize how the story will eventually unfold and what meaning it will have to the Jewish nation.
I then started wondering, did the Jewish people know that Esther was Jewish. I always assumed they did, for after all Esther was part of the community and people knew what she looked like. Presumably, everyone either saw the queen or a picture of the queen and knew what the queen looked like. So it stands to reason that those in the Jewish community knew who the queen really was. Also, even if someone wasn't 100% sure, Mordechai was hanging out by the palace every day. What was his connection to the queen? If you put two and two together it s not a big jump to realize the queen was Jewish.
However, if that is true and every Jew knew thequeen was Jewish, how did she keep it a secret? There must have been someone out there who would spill the beans (even though this was before the days of blogs). I guess you could say that since everyone thought she came from them, noone would have believed a Jew that said the queen was Jewish. The idea was so far fetched and preposterous that it wouldn't really be believable. If this is correct, then this adds to the Shelah's comment. The Jews thought they had an ace in the hole because the queen was Jewish. Therefore, Esther had to pretend she had turned to the "dark side" in order to get the Jews to put their faith in the one who really counts-HKBH.
There is of course the possibility that the Jews didn't know Esther was Jewish. The reason Mordechai hung out at the palace was because he had taken up the well known art of shtadlanus in order to help his people. From an outsiders perspective he had done a pretty good job and managed to create a close friendship with the queen. The Jews might have thought that with Mordechai as the queen's confidant they had a good chance of defeating Haman. Esther was worried they would place to much trust in this so she created the impression taht she was friendly with Haman. Now the Jews had to turn to HKBH to help them.
I am not sure which scenario is correct. It could be I am missing an obvious proof to either side. However, anyway you slice it I find the dynamics that were going on at the time very fascinating. We tend to focus on Purim as a story of a nes nistar and Hashem saving us (as well as we should as that is our job as Ovdei Hashem) but I also find it interesting viewing Purim through the eyes of someone living through the events as they happened, someone who doesn't realize how the story will eventually unfold and what meaning it will have to the Jewish nation.
Monday, February 19, 2007
Parshas Mishpatim: Acharei Rabim L'Hatos
This weeks shiur was on the sugya of Rov, specifically the sugya of bittul b’rov. There are actually several types of Rov that exist. The Chinuch and the Rambam both explain the mitzvah of “acharei rabiml’hatos” as referring to how a beis din determines a psak. In other words, when a case comes before a beis din, the majority opinion wins. However, there other cases of Rov which the rishonim understand is also a din d’oreisa. For example, there is ruba d’leisa kaman which is a type of statistical majority. One example of this is the klal that “rov b’heimos k’sheirin”, most animals are kosher and are not a traifa. Therefore, we generally do not have to check an animal that is shechted to see if it is treif since most animals are kosher. The exception is the lungs where there is a miut hamatzoi of animals that have treif lungs so we check the lungs. The other type of Rov is “ruba d’isa kaman”. Two examples of this is the classic case of finding meat in front of ten stores, 9 kosher and 1 treif. We follow the majority and say the meat came from the kosher store. The second example is bittul b’rov where 1 treif piece of meat is mixed with 2 kosher pieces. We follow the majority and say you can eat each piece, since the majority of pieces are kosher.
The question is, how do we derive these other cases of Rov from the posuk of “acharei rabim l’hatos” which is referring to beis din. The Sha’ar Yosher in Sha’ar 3 explains that there are two types of cases that beis din can judge on. There is one type of case where all you need beis din for is to clarify the facts. For example, in a dinei mamonos case whether Reuvein owes or does not owe money to Shimon exists without beis din’s psak. Beis din is just there to clarify the halacha. However, there are cases like dinei nefashos or kinasos, where you need a psak din to create the chiyuv. In this second case, the psak din cannot be created unless all the dayanim pasken unanimously. When 20 say chayav and 3 say patur, it is considered unanimous because we view the minority opinion as either not being there or having their vote changed to agree with the majority.
The Sha’ar Yosher explains that from the first case where the majority of beis din is just clarifying the halacha we learn the klal of kol d’parish m’ruba parish. There the rov is just clarifying for us how to act. The second case where beis din creates a psak and the minority opinion turns into the majority, teaches us the din of bittul b’rov that he minority is battul to the majority.
Regarding bittul b’rov, there is a machlokes between the Rosh and Rashba how it works. The Rosh learns that the issur is nehepach l’hetter, it turns into hetter. The Rashba holds there is no nehepach but rather we say that each piece I eat is from the rov and is muttar. The main nafka mina is whether one can eat all three pieces at the same time. The Rosh says you would be allowed to since the issur turns into hetter. The Rashba says you can’t because by eating all 3 at one time you are definitely eating issur.
The truth is that most achronim learn the Rashba really agrees with the Rosh that issur nehepach l’hetter and his shitta is only a chumrah m’d’rabanan. The Pri Migadim in the pesicha l’hilchos ta’aroves as well as the Sha’ar Yosher bring a rayah from lach b’lach. The Rashba says that if min b’mino is mixed lach b’lach then you need 60 times the issur as a chumrah d’rabanan, gezeirah min b’sheino mino. If the Rashba really holds that there is no nehepach, so how is lach b’lach any different then eating all the pieces of a ta’aroves yaveish b’yaveish at the same time. If yaveish b’yaveish is assur m’d’oreisa bvas achas, so too lach b’lach should be assur m’d’oreisa. So from here you see that the Rashba really holds of nehepach, but as a chumrah you can’t eat all 3 pieces together.
Rav Soloveitchik in Shiurei HaRav on Ta’aroves brings another rayah. According to the Rashba if you eat the all the pieces at once you should be chayav a chatas. Also, even if one person eats all the pieces one at a time you should be chayav. From the fact you are not chayav a chatas we see it is only a chumrah d’rabanan.
There is a Tosafos Rid who holds if one person eats all the pieces one at a time you are chayav a chatas. This Tosafos rid must hold there is no din of nehepach. Also, the GR”A understands the Rashba as a d’oreisa. When the Mechabeir brings this halacha in Siman 109 and paskens like the Rashba the GR”A writes that the reason is because we go after Rov and we say each piece I eat is from the majority. If the Rashba really held of nehepach the GR”A should have mentioned that sevara as well.
According to the GR”A and Tosafos Rid, how do you answer the question from lach b’lach? Perhaps you can answer based on a Ra Elchanan in Kovetz He’oros. Rav Elchanan writes that according to Tosafos in Yevamos there is a difference in the bittul of yaveish b’yaveish and lach b’lach. By yaveish b’yaveish, the misbateil isn’t transformed into the item doing the bittul. Its just halachically it has a din heter. By lach b’lach it becomes part of the item doing the bittul. Therefore, lach b’lach has a kula that a real nehepach takes place even in metzius and you would then be able to eat them all together. However, by yaveish it’s a nehepach al pi din but not in metzius. According to the Tosafos Rid, the bittul b’rov by yaveish b’yaveish is that we say each one I eat is the hetter, while by lach b’lach it is a real nehepach and you only need shishim m’d’rabanan
The question is, how do we derive these other cases of Rov from the posuk of “acharei rabim l’hatos” which is referring to beis din. The Sha’ar Yosher in Sha’ar 3 explains that there are two types of cases that beis din can judge on. There is one type of case where all you need beis din for is to clarify the facts. For example, in a dinei mamonos case whether Reuvein owes or does not owe money to Shimon exists without beis din’s psak. Beis din is just there to clarify the halacha. However, there are cases like dinei nefashos or kinasos, where you need a psak din to create the chiyuv. In this second case, the psak din cannot be created unless all the dayanim pasken unanimously. When 20 say chayav and 3 say patur, it is considered unanimous because we view the minority opinion as either not being there or having their vote changed to agree with the majority.
The Sha’ar Yosher explains that from the first case where the majority of beis din is just clarifying the halacha we learn the klal of kol d’parish m’ruba parish. There the rov is just clarifying for us how to act. The second case where beis din creates a psak and the minority opinion turns into the majority, teaches us the din of bittul b’rov that he minority is battul to the majority.
Regarding bittul b’rov, there is a machlokes between the Rosh and Rashba how it works. The Rosh learns that the issur is nehepach l’hetter, it turns into hetter. The Rashba holds there is no nehepach but rather we say that each piece I eat is from the rov and is muttar. The main nafka mina is whether one can eat all three pieces at the same time. The Rosh says you would be allowed to since the issur turns into hetter. The Rashba says you can’t because by eating all 3 at one time you are definitely eating issur.
The truth is that most achronim learn the Rashba really agrees with the Rosh that issur nehepach l’hetter and his shitta is only a chumrah m’d’rabanan. The Pri Migadim in the pesicha l’hilchos ta’aroves as well as the Sha’ar Yosher bring a rayah from lach b’lach. The Rashba says that if min b’mino is mixed lach b’lach then you need 60 times the issur as a chumrah d’rabanan, gezeirah min b’sheino mino. If the Rashba really holds that there is no nehepach, so how is lach b’lach any different then eating all the pieces of a ta’aroves yaveish b’yaveish at the same time. If yaveish b’yaveish is assur m’d’oreisa bvas achas, so too lach b’lach should be assur m’d’oreisa. So from here you see that the Rashba really holds of nehepach, but as a chumrah you can’t eat all 3 pieces together.
Rav Soloveitchik in Shiurei HaRav on Ta’aroves brings another rayah. According to the Rashba if you eat the all the pieces at once you should be chayav a chatas. Also, even if one person eats all the pieces one at a time you should be chayav. From the fact you are not chayav a chatas we see it is only a chumrah d’rabanan.
There is a Tosafos Rid who holds if one person eats all the pieces one at a time you are chayav a chatas. This Tosafos rid must hold there is no din of nehepach. Also, the GR”A understands the Rashba as a d’oreisa. When the Mechabeir brings this halacha in Siman 109 and paskens like the Rashba the GR”A writes that the reason is because we go after Rov and we say each piece I eat is from the majority. If the Rashba really held of nehepach the GR”A should have mentioned that sevara as well.
According to the GR”A and Tosafos Rid, how do you answer the question from lach b’lach? Perhaps you can answer based on a Ra Elchanan in Kovetz He’oros. Rav Elchanan writes that according to Tosafos in Yevamos there is a difference in the bittul of yaveish b’yaveish and lach b’lach. By yaveish b’yaveish, the misbateil isn’t transformed into the item doing the bittul. Its just halachically it has a din heter. By lach b’lach it becomes part of the item doing the bittul. Therefore, lach b’lach has a kula that a real nehepach takes place even in metzius and you would then be able to eat them all together. However, by yaveish it’s a nehepach al pi din but not in metzius. According to the Tosafos Rid, the bittul b’rov by yaveish b’yaveish is that we say each one I eat is the hetter, while by lach b’lach it is a real nehepach and you only need shishim m’d’rabanan
Wednesday, February 14, 2007
Parshas Yisro:The Mitzva of Emuna
This past week's shiur was on the mitzva of emuna. There are really two questions that I focused on a) is it a mitzvah b) what does this mitzvah entail.
Is Emunah A Mitzvah
Rambam and Ramban
Both the Ramban and Rambam classify emunah as a mitzvah. The Rambam brings a rayah from the gemara in Makkos (23b) that the gematria of Torah is 611 and there are 2 more mitzvos that BB'nei Yisroel heard directly from HKBH-namely the first 2 dibros. We see that emuna which is learnt from the first dibra is a mitzvah. The Ramban in Lo Saseh 5 also counts it as a mitzvah. He is howeevr bothered by the fact that the Rambam learns 4 lavin from the 2nd dibra. According to teh Rambam the gemara should have said that 5 mitzvos came from HKBH. The answer to this question (found in the nosei keilim on Sefer Hamitzvos as well as in Rav Perlow's sefer on the mitzvos of Rav Sa'adia Gaon is to say that only the first part of the 2nd dibra was said by HKBH. The rest of the 2nd dibra was said by Moshe.
B'HAG and Rav Sa'adia Gaon (RSG)
Both the B'HAG and Rav Sa'adia Gaon do not count emuna as a mitzva. The Ramban (aseh 1) explains that the B'HAG holds that emuna is the prerequisite to all mitzvos Before you can accept the g'zeiros of the melech you first have to be accept the person as a melech. Similarly, before we can except the mitzvos we have to first believe in HKBH. The Rashbatz in ohar HaRakia brings a rayah to this shitta from Huryos 12b. The gemara says that the first mitzva accepted by the B'nei Yisroel was not to worship idols. L'chorah, the first mitzva should be emunah. From here we see emuna is not a mitzvah. To answer this rayah the Tashbetz (Siman 129) says the gemara is referring to the first lav accepted. Also, if you look in Rashi there, Rashi quotes both the 1st and 2nd dibra).
The question is what does the B'HAG and RSG do with the gemara in Makkos? Rav Perlow writes an interesting chiddush. He writes that this mitzvah of emuna is really part of the mitzvah of kabbalas ol malchus shamayim in k'riyas shema. The reason emunah is not counted as a separate mitzvah is because the mitzva is done thru saying shema. Having emunah is not a kiyum of the mitzvah, the kiyum is thru expressing emunah in shema. When the gemara refers to "anochi hashem" as a mitzvah it was referring to saying it in shema.
What does this mitzvah entail?
There is a big debate whether the mitzvah of emuna requires dirisha and chakira or emunah peshuta. In the Lev Tov edition of the Chovos HaLevavos, before Sha'ar Yichud there is an extensive hakdama bringing down all the shittos. ayin sham. (Because of this machlokes, the Lev Tov edition does not translate Sha'ar Yichud). The Chinuch seems to hold the basic mitzva is emuna peshuta and the chakiros are a mitzva min hamuvchar. The Rashba and Rivash were against philosophical chakiros. My only question is would they say chakiros that are not philosophical in nature (if such an idea exists, maybe thru nature/biology) are a mitzvah or there is no shuch thing as a mitzvah of chakirah).
I did hear once in a tape from Rav Moshe Wolfson that emuna is a yerusha to all Jews from Avraham. Teh Sho'el U'Meishiv has a similar idea. He writes that the reason the B'HAG did not count emuna as a mitzva is because it required a person to impart his own knowledge (hachra'as hada'as) and a mitzvah by defintion is done as a gezeirah. The Rambam howeevr held the hachra'as hada'as was done by Avraham and once Avraham reached his conclusion that there is a creator, it is not necessary for anyone else to investigate.
Rav Elchanan Wasserman in Kovetz Ma'amarim also writes that emuna is something anyone, even a non Jew can attain by looking at creation. The only reason we fail to do so is because our ta'avos are stopping us. This is why even a Ben Noach will be held responsible for not following the ratzon of Hashem, he should have overcome his ta'avos to realize there is a creator and investigate what that creator wants him to do.
Is Emunah A Mitzvah
Rambam and Ramban
Both the Ramban and Rambam classify emunah as a mitzvah. The Rambam brings a rayah from the gemara in Makkos (23b) that the gematria of Torah is 611 and there are 2 more mitzvos that BB'nei Yisroel heard directly from HKBH-namely the first 2 dibros. We see that emuna which is learnt from the first dibra is a mitzvah. The Ramban in Lo Saseh 5 also counts it as a mitzvah. He is howeevr bothered by the fact that the Rambam learns 4 lavin from the 2nd dibra. According to teh Rambam the gemara should have said that 5 mitzvos came from HKBH. The answer to this question (found in the nosei keilim on Sefer Hamitzvos as well as in Rav Perlow's sefer on the mitzvos of Rav Sa'adia Gaon is to say that only the first part of the 2nd dibra was said by HKBH. The rest of the 2nd dibra was said by Moshe.
B'HAG and Rav Sa'adia Gaon (RSG)
Both the B'HAG and Rav Sa'adia Gaon do not count emuna as a mitzva. The Ramban (aseh 1) explains that the B'HAG holds that emuna is the prerequisite to all mitzvos Before you can accept the g'zeiros of the melech you first have to be accept the person as a melech. Similarly, before we can except the mitzvos we have to first believe in HKBH. The Rashbatz in ohar HaRakia brings a rayah to this shitta from Huryos 12b. The gemara says that the first mitzva accepted by the B'nei Yisroel was not to worship idols. L'chorah, the first mitzva should be emunah. From here we see emuna is not a mitzvah. To answer this rayah the Tashbetz (Siman 129) says the gemara is referring to the first lav accepted. Also, if you look in Rashi there, Rashi quotes both the 1st and 2nd dibra).
The question is what does the B'HAG and RSG do with the gemara in Makkos? Rav Perlow writes an interesting chiddush. He writes that this mitzvah of emuna is really part of the mitzvah of kabbalas ol malchus shamayim in k'riyas shema. The reason emunah is not counted as a separate mitzvah is because the mitzva is done thru saying shema. Having emunah is not a kiyum of the mitzvah, the kiyum is thru expressing emunah in shema. When the gemara refers to "anochi hashem" as a mitzvah it was referring to saying it in shema.
What does this mitzvah entail?
There is a big debate whether the mitzvah of emuna requires dirisha and chakira or emunah peshuta. In the Lev Tov edition of the Chovos HaLevavos, before Sha'ar Yichud there is an extensive hakdama bringing down all the shittos. ayin sham. (Because of this machlokes, the Lev Tov edition does not translate Sha'ar Yichud). The Chinuch seems to hold the basic mitzva is emuna peshuta and the chakiros are a mitzva min hamuvchar. The Rashba and Rivash were against philosophical chakiros. My only question is would they say chakiros that are not philosophical in nature (if such an idea exists, maybe thru nature/biology) are a mitzvah or there is no shuch thing as a mitzvah of chakirah).
I did hear once in a tape from Rav Moshe Wolfson that emuna is a yerusha to all Jews from Avraham. Teh Sho'el U'Meishiv has a similar idea. He writes that the reason the B'HAG did not count emuna as a mitzva is because it required a person to impart his own knowledge (hachra'as hada'as) and a mitzvah by defintion is done as a gezeirah. The Rambam howeevr held the hachra'as hada'as was done by Avraham and once Avraham reached his conclusion that there is a creator, it is not necessary for anyone else to investigate.
Rav Elchanan Wasserman in Kovetz Ma'amarim also writes that emuna is something anyone, even a non Jew can attain by looking at creation. The only reason we fail to do so is because our ta'avos are stopping us. This is why even a Ben Noach will be held responsible for not following the ratzon of Hashem, he should have overcome his ta'avos to realize there is a creator and investigate what that creator wants him to do.
Tuesday, February 06, 2007
Parshas B'shalach: Leining the Haftorah from a klaf
In this weeks parshas we learn that Moshe instituted the din of leining every 3 days. Since we also lein the Haftorah every Shabbos, I decided to speak about that.
Basically, the question I discussed is whether one can lein the Haftorah from a chumash or must it be done from a klaf.
The source for this halacha is a gemara in Gittin 60a. The gemara is discussing the sugyah of "devarim sh'bichsav ee atta omram al peh", meaning one is not allowed to say words of Torah that is supposed to be written down. Included in this issur would be reading words of Torah that are not written correctly. The gemara then asks that there were amoraim who would lain the haftorah from a "sefer aftarata", which was a scroll that had all the haftorahs written in it. The problem with this is that really each Navi should be written as a whole sefer and you are not allowed to write half a sefer or even one parsha of Navi by itself. If one reads from such a sefer then you are in violation of the issur of "d'varim sh'bichsav..". The gemara answers that we have no choice in the matter (eis la'asos) and as Rashi explains it would be too expensive to have scrolls for each sefer of Navi. Therefore, we are allowed to write one scroll for all the haftoras.
The question is how does one understand the above gemara and what was the original takana.
Shittas Levush and Aruch Hashulchan
One could say that the original takana was to read the haftorah from a klaf that is written with the same rules that apply to a sefer torah (i.e you need klaf, d'yo, gidin etc). On top of that there is an additional issue of "d'varim sh'bichsav..". Based on the takana alone, one could use a sefer aftarata. However, due to the prohibition of "d'varim sh'bichsav.." we need to use a whole sefer of Nach. It is only because of eis la'asos that we can use a aftarata. This seems to be the opinion of the Levush (Y.D. Siman 284) and Aruch Hashulchan. They both hold that b'zman hazeh even with the advent of the printing press, one should still use a klaf for the haftorah. Since this was part of the original takana, the eis la'asos never took off that requirement.
Shittas Shulchan Aruch HaRav
The other way to understand the sugyah is that there never was a takana to read the haftorah from a klaf. One could even read it ba'al peh. The only reason one needs a klaf that is written with the same rules that apply to a sefer torah is for the same reason that you need a whole sefer, because of the issue of "d'varim sh'bichsav..". However, once we say eis la'asos and "d'varim sh'bichsav.." don't apply, then not only don't we need a whole sefer but we don't even need a klaf and a printed chumash works also. This is the shitta of the Ba'al Hatanya and he basically spells out this tzad in Siman 284. I believe the Chazon Ish also holds like this as well.
Shittas Magen Avraham
There is a middle shitta and that is the opinion of the Magen Avraham. It appears that the MG"A holds like teh Ba'al HaTanya because he says in 284:6 that b'shas hadchak you can lein the haftorah ba'al peh. So you see he holds there was no takana to use a sefer. However, there is one major chiluk between the MG"A and Ba'al HaTanya. The MG"A writes that printed seforim have a din of a proper kesiva and therefore there is no chisaron of "d'varim sh'bichsav" when using a printed Nach. However, it has to be a sefer shaleim. To use a haftorah book or a chumash with the haftorah printed at the end would be a chisaron of d'varim sh'bichsav. According to the Ba'al HaTanya, it seems a haftorah book is no different then a sefer shaleim of Nach. (The Chazon Ish seems to agree with the Ba'al HaTanya)
L'maskana, if one wanted to be choshesh for all shitttos, this should be the order of preference.
1) a klaf of a sefer shaleim (if leining Yirmiyahu, you should lein from the entire sefer)
2) printed sefer shaleim. (which means taking the volume of Yirmiyahu from your Mikraos Gedoos set is better than the Artscroll Chumash with the haftorah at the end)
3) A printed book of haftoras or a chumash with haftorah in it.
An interesting question is which is better, a book of haftora written on klaf or a printed sefer shaleim.
Basically, the question I discussed is whether one can lein the Haftorah from a chumash or must it be done from a klaf.
The source for this halacha is a gemara in Gittin 60a. The gemara is discussing the sugyah of "devarim sh'bichsav ee atta omram al peh", meaning one is not allowed to say words of Torah that is supposed to be written down. Included in this issur would be reading words of Torah that are not written correctly. The gemara then asks that there were amoraim who would lain the haftorah from a "sefer aftarata", which was a scroll that had all the haftorahs written in it. The problem with this is that really each Navi should be written as a whole sefer and you are not allowed to write half a sefer or even one parsha of Navi by itself. If one reads from such a sefer then you are in violation of the issur of "d'varim sh'bichsav..". The gemara answers that we have no choice in the matter (eis la'asos) and as Rashi explains it would be too expensive to have scrolls for each sefer of Navi. Therefore, we are allowed to write one scroll for all the haftoras.
The question is how does one understand the above gemara and what was the original takana.
Shittas Levush and Aruch Hashulchan
One could say that the original takana was to read the haftorah from a klaf that is written with the same rules that apply to a sefer torah (i.e you need klaf, d'yo, gidin etc). On top of that there is an additional issue of "d'varim sh'bichsav..". Based on the takana alone, one could use a sefer aftarata. However, due to the prohibition of "d'varim sh'bichsav.." we need to use a whole sefer of Nach. It is only because of eis la'asos that we can use a aftarata. This seems to be the opinion of the Levush (Y.D. Siman 284) and Aruch Hashulchan. They both hold that b'zman hazeh even with the advent of the printing press, one should still use a klaf for the haftorah. Since this was part of the original takana, the eis la'asos never took off that requirement.
Shittas Shulchan Aruch HaRav
The other way to understand the sugyah is that there never was a takana to read the haftorah from a klaf. One could even read it ba'al peh. The only reason one needs a klaf that is written with the same rules that apply to a sefer torah is for the same reason that you need a whole sefer, because of the issue of "d'varim sh'bichsav..". However, once we say eis la'asos and "d'varim sh'bichsav.." don't apply, then not only don't we need a whole sefer but we don't even need a klaf and a printed chumash works also. This is the shitta of the Ba'al Hatanya and he basically spells out this tzad in Siman 284. I believe the Chazon Ish also holds like this as well.
Shittas Magen Avraham
There is a middle shitta and that is the opinion of the Magen Avraham. It appears that the MG"A holds like teh Ba'al HaTanya because he says in 284:6 that b'shas hadchak you can lein the haftorah ba'al peh. So you see he holds there was no takana to use a sefer. However, there is one major chiluk between the MG"A and Ba'al HaTanya. The MG"A writes that printed seforim have a din of a proper kesiva and therefore there is no chisaron of "d'varim sh'bichsav" when using a printed Nach. However, it has to be a sefer shaleim. To use a haftorah book or a chumash with the haftorah printed at the end would be a chisaron of d'varim sh'bichsav. According to the Ba'al HaTanya, it seems a haftorah book is no different then a sefer shaleim of Nach. (The Chazon Ish seems to agree with the Ba'al HaTanya)
L'maskana, if one wanted to be choshesh for all shitttos, this should be the order of preference.
1) a klaf of a sefer shaleim (if leining Yirmiyahu, you should lein from the entire sefer)
2) printed sefer shaleim. (which means taking the volume of Yirmiyahu from your Mikraos Gedoos set is better than the Artscroll Chumash with the haftorah at the end)
3) A printed book of haftoras or a chumash with haftorah in it.
An interesting question is which is better, a book of haftora written on klaf or a printed sefer shaleim.
K'riyas Yam Suf: Neis or Nature
Rabbi Belsky in his new sefer on Sh'mos in explaining the idea behind "kasha zivugin k'kriyas yam suf" touches upon the nature of the miracle of kiriyas yam suf. (emphasis added)
"Rav Ya'akov Kamenetzky would quote Chazal in Chagiga 12B that the rules of nature were composed with immense wisdom. The whole creation is filled with chachma, bina and da'as of the Ribono Shel Olam.
By definition the performance of a neis abrogates the chukei hateva opposing the chachma of the Ribono Shel Olam on some level. Thus when Chazal say that k'riyas yam suf was hard for HKBH they are not referring to the difficulty of the act but rather to the need to act contrary to the wisdom with which He endowed the world. This is the difficulty for Hashem inherent in every neis-for it is difficult for the very source of wisdom to act in a way that opposes wisdom"
Rav Ya'akov Hillel in his sefer Ascending Jacob's Ladder also writes the following (page 100)
(emphasis mine)
"Rabbeinu Asher, known as the Rosh, wrote in Orchos Tzaddikim that believing only in the first part of the verse-that Hashem created the world-is not enough. A Jew must believe in the continuation of the verse, that Hashem took us out of Eygpt. ... However as the Rosh tells us all the wonderous events of the Exodus-the fact that Hashem changed the course of nature, that he made miracles, that he brought ten plagues on the Eygptians and more - are proof of his direct involvement in the world"
"Rav Ya'akov Kamenetzky would quote Chazal in Chagiga 12B that the rules of nature were composed with immense wisdom. The whole creation is filled with chachma, bina and da'as of the Ribono Shel Olam.
By definition the performance of a neis abrogates the chukei hateva opposing the chachma of the Ribono Shel Olam on some level. Thus when Chazal say that k'riyas yam suf was hard for HKBH they are not referring to the difficulty of the act but rather to the need to act contrary to the wisdom with which He endowed the world. This is the difficulty for Hashem inherent in every neis-for it is difficult for the very source of wisdom to act in a way that opposes wisdom"
Rav Ya'akov Hillel in his sefer Ascending Jacob's Ladder also writes the following (page 100)
(emphasis mine)
"Rabbeinu Asher, known as the Rosh, wrote in Orchos Tzaddikim that believing only in the first part of the verse-that Hashem created the world-is not enough. A Jew must believe in the continuation of the verse, that Hashem took us out of Eygpt. ... However as the Rosh tells us all the wonderous events of the Exodus-the fact that Hashem changed the course of nature, that he made miracles, that he brought ten plagues on the Eygptians and more - are proof of his direct involvement in the world"
Thursday, January 25, 2007
Hashgacha and Gilgul
I noticed a new book by Artscroll that has come out called Ascending Jacob's Ladder by Rav Yaakov Hillel who is a Rosh Yeshiva n Eretz Yisroel and a mekubal. It looked interesting so I bought it.
It is basically a collection of essays and lectures that he has given over the years.
Here is one idea in the book that I found interesting.
Many people are familiar with the machlokes between the Ba'al Shem Tov and others regarding hashgacha p'ratis. To put ity simply (and superficially) the Ba'al Shem Tov believes there is hashgacha p'ratis on every creation, even inanimate ones. Others disagree and say hashgacha p'ratis is reserved for people and inanimate objects are only bound by hashgacha klalit.
Rav Ya'akov Hillel writes an interesting p'shat in the Ba'al Shem Tov"S mehalech on pages 101-102.
"The truth is there is no contradiction, as the Rambam explains in Morei Nevuchim. There is hashgacha on everything created and everything that happens. What then is the difference between these two types of hashgacha [hashgacha pratit and hashgacha klalit] ...The kabbalists tell us something beyond this. They say that sometimes a soul can transmigrate and assume the form of a stone, water or an animal. If there is a soul in a leaf or a cat than anything that happens to that leaf or cat because it is part of the soul's tikkun is an act of hashgacha pratit. This is what is meant by those who say that whatever happens to even an animal or leaf is Divinely ordained, Otherwise an animal or leaf is ruled by hashgacha klalit."
It is basically a collection of essays and lectures that he has given over the years.
Here is one idea in the book that I found interesting.
Many people are familiar with the machlokes between the Ba'al Shem Tov and others regarding hashgacha p'ratis. To put ity simply (and superficially) the Ba'al Shem Tov believes there is hashgacha p'ratis on every creation, even inanimate ones. Others disagree and say hashgacha p'ratis is reserved for people and inanimate objects are only bound by hashgacha klalit.
Rav Ya'akov Hillel writes an interesting p'shat in the Ba'al Shem Tov"S mehalech on pages 101-102.
"The truth is there is no contradiction, as the Rambam explains in Morei Nevuchim. There is hashgacha on everything created and everything that happens. What then is the difference between these two types of hashgacha [hashgacha pratit and hashgacha klalit] ...The kabbalists tell us something beyond this. They say that sometimes a soul can transmigrate and assume the form of a stone, water or an animal. If there is a soul in a leaf or a cat than anything that happens to that leaf or cat because it is part of the soul's tikkun is an act of hashgacha pratit. This is what is meant by those who say that whatever happens to even an animal or leaf is Divinely ordained, Otherwise an animal or leaf is ruled by hashgacha klalit."
Hashgacha and Gilgul
I noticed a new book by Artscroll that has come out called Ascending Jacob's Ladder by Rav Yaakov Hillel who is a Rosh Yeshiva n Eretz Yisroel and a mekubal. It looked interesting so I bought it.
It is basically a collection of essays and lectures that he has given over the years.
Here is one idea in the book that I found interesting.
Many people are familiar with the machlokes between the Ba'al Shem Tov and others regarding hashgacha p'ratis. To put ity simply (and superficially) the Ba'al Shem Tov believes there is hashgacha p'ratis on every creation, even inanimate ones. Others disagree and say hashgacha p'ratis is reserved for people and inanimate objects are only bound by hashgacha klalit.
Rav Ya'akov Hillel writes an interesting p'shat in the Ba'al Shem Tov"S mehalech on pages 101-102.
"The truth is there is no contradiction, as the Rambam explains in Morei Nevuchim. There is hashgacha on everything created and everything that happens. What then is the difference between these two types of hashgacha [hashgacha pratit and hashgacha klalit] ...The kabbalists tell us something beyond this. They say that sometimes a soul can transmigrate and assume the form of a stone, water or an animal. If there is a soul in a leaf or a cat than anything that happens to that leaf or cat because it is part of the soul's tikkun is an act of hashgacha pratit. This is what is meant by those who say that whatever happens to even an animal or leaf is Divinely ordained, Otherwise an animal or leaf is ruled by hashgacha klalit."
It is basically a collection of essays and lectures that he has given over the years.
Here is one idea in the book that I found interesting.
Many people are familiar with the machlokes between the Ba'al Shem Tov and others regarding hashgacha p'ratis. To put ity simply (and superficially) the Ba'al Shem Tov believes there is hashgacha p'ratis on every creation, even inanimate ones. Others disagree and say hashgacha p'ratis is reserved for people and inanimate objects are only bound by hashgacha klalit.
Rav Ya'akov Hillel writes an interesting p'shat in the Ba'al Shem Tov"S mehalech on pages 101-102.
"The truth is there is no contradiction, as the Rambam explains in Morei Nevuchim. There is hashgacha on everything created and everything that happens. What then is the difference between these two types of hashgacha [hashgacha pratit and hashgacha klalit] ...The kabbalists tell us something beyond this. They say that sometimes a soul can transmigrate and assume the form of a stone, water or an animal. If there is a soul in a leaf or a cat than anything that happens to that leaf or cat because it is part of the soul's tikkun is an act of hashgacha pratit. This is what is meant by those who say that whatever happens to even an animal or leaf is Divinely ordained, Otherwise an animal or leaf is ruled by hashgacha klalit."
Wednesday, January 17, 2007
Catagorizing the Shevatim
Someone pointed out to me an interesting question from the beginning of Parshas Shemos. The Torah groups the Shevatim into three pesukim. Posuk 1 is Reuvein, Shimon, Levi and Yehuda.
Possuk 2 is Yisascher, Zevulen and Binyamin. Posuk 3 is Gad, Asher, Dan and Naftali. Why are Yissascher and Zevulen who are B'nei Leah, put with Binyamin? They should be with Reuvein, Shimon, Levi and Yehuda.
I was told that Rav Yochanan Zweig answers that if we look at the numbers that went down to Mitzrayim, B'nei Leah excluding Yocheved numbered 32 and B'nei Rochel numbered 14. Furthermore, Yisacher and Zevulen had 9 between them. Now we know that after Leah had her first 4 kids, Rochel should also have had 4 children. Leah was zocheh to 2 more as a reward for giving up the dudaim. The extra 2 children she had was Yisacher and Zevulen. If you take the 9 people from Yisaacher and Zevulen away from Leah and give it to Rochel, they both wind up with 23. This is what the posuk is hinting to in the beginning of Shemos
Possuk 2 is Yisascher, Zevulen and Binyamin. Posuk 3 is Gad, Asher, Dan and Naftali. Why are Yissascher and Zevulen who are B'nei Leah, put with Binyamin? They should be with Reuvein, Shimon, Levi and Yehuda.
I was told that Rav Yochanan Zweig answers that if we look at the numbers that went down to Mitzrayim, B'nei Leah excluding Yocheved numbered 32 and B'nei Rochel numbered 14. Furthermore, Yisacher and Zevulen had 9 between them. Now we know that after Leah had her first 4 kids, Rochel should also have had 4 children. Leah was zocheh to 2 more as a reward for giving up the dudaim. The extra 2 children she had was Yisacher and Zevulen. If you take the 9 people from Yisaacher and Zevulen away from Leah and give it to Rochel, they both wind up with 23. This is what the posuk is hinting to in the beginning of Shemos
Parshas Shemos:Can A Woman Be A Mohel
My shiur last week discussed whether a woman can do mila, In Parshas Shemos we read how Tzippora gave her son a bris. The gemara in Avodah Zara (27a) has a machlokes whether a woman can be a mohel. Teh gemara asks, according to the opinion that a woman can't do teh mila, how do you understand the ma'aseh with Tzipporah? The gemara gives two answers, either a) Tzipporah asked someone else to do it b) Tzipporah started and Moshe finished the mila.
Machlokes Rishonim
How do we pasken? There is a machlokes Rishonim on this issue. Tosafos brings the opinion that a woman can not do the mila. This is also the shitta of the S'mak and Hagahos Mordechai. The Rif and Rosh (at the end of Perek 19 in Shabbo) and the Rambam pasken a woman could do the mila only if a man is not present. If there is a man around, the man should do the mila.
Mechabeir vs Rema
Both the Mechabeir and Rema (Y.D. Siman 264) pasken a woman could do the mila . However, the Rema adds on that the minhag is a woman should not do the mila. The Shach asks what is the Rema adding on to the Mechabeir. The Mechabeir would not disagree with the Rema.
The Aruch Hashulchan writes that the nafka mina between teh Mechabeir and rema is in acase where there is no male mohel in town but there is a male mohel in a different town. According to the Mechabeir one would not need to go to a different town to find a mohel and according to the Rema one should go to the other town because that is how the minhag evolved. Accordingto this the Rema would hold there is nothing wrong with a woman doing the mila, just teh minhag is that she doesn't.
The Sefer HaBris gives a different hesber based on the Ra'avyah. Teh Ra'avyah understands teh Rema that he is being machmir for the shitta that a woman is posul. Therefore, we don't use a woman because maybe she really can't do the mila. The Mchabeir would hold that m'ikkar hadin a woman is kosher to do the mila but it is better to use a man.
Tichilas B'P'sul V'Sofo B'Kashrus
The gemra in Avodah Zara suggested that Tzipporah started the mila and Moshe finished the mila. This leads to the question, can a posul (an akum) start the mila if a kosher mohel finishes the job. Both teh Shut Beis Ya'akov (ayin Pischei Teshuva) and the Ohr Sameiach (hilchos mila)address this question. The both bring a rayah from the gemara in AZ that you could do this. However, the Ohr Sameiach points out that it would not work on Shabbos. On Shabbos, machshirei mila that can be done before Shabbos are not allowed to be done on Shabbos. (l'moshol if the mila knife breaks on Shabbos you can't bring a new one if it involves carrying). Therefore, when a posul starts the mila it has the staus of machshirei mila since there is no mitzvah for the posul to do the mila. This machshirei mila could have been done before Shabbos (even though it would have been before day 8, since a posul mohel is doing the mila who cares when he starts it). Therefore, a posul can't start the mila on Shabbos.
The Sefer Habris brings a teshuva from the Yidei Moshe that disagrees. He says this question is based on the machlokes in Chullin whether "yesh l'shchitah m'tichila ad sof" or "aino ella l'sof". Since we pasken "yesh l'shchitah m'tichila ad sof", we need a kosher mohel to do the whole mila.
Obviously the Ohr Sameiach disagrees with the comparison. I'll leave this question hanging. How would the Ohr Sameiach answer the kasha from shechita?
Machlokes Rishonim
How do we pasken? There is a machlokes Rishonim on this issue. Tosafos brings the opinion that a woman can not do the mila. This is also the shitta of the S'mak and Hagahos Mordechai. The Rif and Rosh (at the end of Perek 19 in Shabbo) and the Rambam pasken a woman could do the mila only if a man is not present. If there is a man around, the man should do the mila.
Mechabeir vs Rema
Both the Mechabeir and Rema (Y.D. Siman 264) pasken a woman could do the mila . However, the Rema adds on that the minhag is a woman should not do the mila. The Shach asks what is the Rema adding on to the Mechabeir. The Mechabeir would not disagree with the Rema.
The Aruch Hashulchan writes that the nafka mina between teh Mechabeir and rema is in acase where there is no male mohel in town but there is a male mohel in a different town. According to the Mechabeir one would not need to go to a different town to find a mohel and according to the Rema one should go to the other town because that is how the minhag evolved. Accordingto this the Rema would hold there is nothing wrong with a woman doing the mila, just teh minhag is that she doesn't.
The Sefer HaBris gives a different hesber based on the Ra'avyah. Teh Ra'avyah understands teh Rema that he is being machmir for the shitta that a woman is posul. Therefore, we don't use a woman because maybe she really can't do the mila. The Mchabeir would hold that m'ikkar hadin a woman is kosher to do the mila but it is better to use a man.
Tichilas B'P'sul V'Sofo B'Kashrus
The gemra in Avodah Zara suggested that Tzipporah started the mila and Moshe finished the mila. This leads to the question, can a posul (an akum) start the mila if a kosher mohel finishes the job. Both teh Shut Beis Ya'akov (ayin Pischei Teshuva) and the Ohr Sameiach (hilchos mila)address this question. The both bring a rayah from the gemara in AZ that you could do this. However, the Ohr Sameiach points out that it would not work on Shabbos. On Shabbos, machshirei mila that can be done before Shabbos are not allowed to be done on Shabbos. (l'moshol if the mila knife breaks on Shabbos you can't bring a new one if it involves carrying). Therefore, when a posul starts the mila it has the staus of machshirei mila since there is no mitzvah for the posul to do the mila. This machshirei mila could have been done before Shabbos (even though it would have been before day 8, since a posul mohel is doing the mila who cares when he starts it). Therefore, a posul can't start the mila on Shabbos.
The Sefer Habris brings a teshuva from the Yidei Moshe that disagrees. He says this question is based on the machlokes in Chullin whether "yesh l'shchitah m'tichila ad sof" or "aino ella l'sof". Since we pasken "yesh l'shchitah m'tichila ad sof", we need a kosher mohel to do the whole mila.
Obviously the Ohr Sameiach disagrees with the comparison. I'll leave this question hanging. How would the Ohr Sameiach answer the kasha from shechita?
Monday, January 08, 2007
Parshas VaYechi:Mitzvah L'Kayeim Divrei HaMeis
This week’s shiur was on the topic of mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis. The Rishonim ask why Yosef needed to take a shevuah that he would bury Ya’akov in Eretz Yisroel. He should be obligated to listen to his father anyway. One of the reasons that Yosef would have to listen would be because of mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis.
D’Oreisa or D’rabanan
Is this a chiyuv d’oreisa or only a d’rabanan? The Shoeil U’Meishiv (Mahadura Tinyana Chelek 1 Siman 1) quotes R’ Yaakov Ibn Shu’an that the Ramban says there are ten things we learn from Ya’akov and one of these things is mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis. Therefore, R’ Yaakov Ibn Shu’an feels that this is a chiuv d’oreisa. The Shoeil U’Meishiv disagrees. There is a machlokes Rishonim whether you need a third party ( a shlish). According to Rabbeinu Tam that you need a shlish, Yosef could not have been obligated to listen because of mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis. The Maharsham (Chelek 2 Siman 224) also asks on this that it is against the Ramban. The Ramban in VaYechi only says Yosef had to listen because of kibud av. Why didn’t he mention the reason of mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis? Furtehrmore, the Maharsham says Tosafos in Kesuvos (86a) says it is only a din d’rabanan. The Shoeil U’Meishivb wants to say it is a taknah based on the idea of chesed shel emes.
How it Works
There is a machlokes Rishonim how this din works. The Machaneh Ephraim (Hil Zichiyah Siman 29) writes that Rashi (Gittin 14B) and Tosafos (Gittin 38a) both hold that it is a kinyan. In fact Rashi says that if Reuvein when he is healthy says to give Shimon $100, then if Reuvein dies Shimon immediately gets the $100 without any ma’aseh kinyan because of mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis. The Rashba (Gittin 38a) disagrees and holds mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis is just an obligation to carry out the wishes of the meis. The Ran and Ramban seem to agree with the Rashba. The nafka mina according to the Machaneh Ephraim is by yesomim ketanim. A katan would not have a chiyuv to carry out his father’s wishes but if it works a sa kinyan then he would have no choice since the m’kabeil gets it immediately. The Ketzos (248:5) also says it is not a kinyan because other wise you would have to explain how you can circumventthe dinei yerusha. (also ayin R’ Elchanan Kesuvos Siman 315)
There is another machlokes Rishonim whether you need a shlish, a 3rd party. Rabbeinu Tam (Gitttin 14a) holds you need a shlish but the Ramban and Ran hold you don’t. Al pi pashtus one would say this is toloi on th e above machlokes but I think I saw the Minchas Asher try and say it is two independent ideas. The Maharsham quotes a Teshuvas Rivash that the Ramban only holds you don’t need a shlish when the meis was a sh’chiv meira. If the meis was a healthy person, you even the Ramban holds you would need a shlish.
When Do We Say It
There is discussion in the poskin whether mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis. Is this solely a monetary issue or even applies to other areas. The Sh’vus Ya’akov (siman 165) says it is only a monetary issue but there is a lifnim m’shuras hadin to listen to the meis in non monetary issues. One of his proofs is from Ya’akov. Why did Yosef require a shevuah if there is a chiyuv of mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis? It must be that mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis only applies to monetary issues. The problem with this is that the Ramban clearly says the shevuah was to help Yosef convince Pharoah. The Maharshdam takes a middle road that there is a chiyuv by monetary issues and a mitzvah by non monetary issues. The Noda BeYehuda (Tenyana Siman 75) discuss this issue also and says if the request was not made to the person it affects there is no chiyuv to listen. The example was a father instructed his wife to marry their daughter to a certain person. Since the command was to the wife and not the daughter there is no mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis. (even if it was made to the daughter directly in this situation there is also no mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis.
D’Oreisa or D’rabanan
Is this a chiyuv d’oreisa or only a d’rabanan? The Shoeil U’Meishiv (Mahadura Tinyana Chelek 1 Siman 1) quotes R’ Yaakov Ibn Shu’an that the Ramban says there are ten things we learn from Ya’akov and one of these things is mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis. Therefore, R’ Yaakov Ibn Shu’an feels that this is a chiuv d’oreisa. The Shoeil U’Meishiv disagrees. There is a machlokes Rishonim whether you need a third party ( a shlish). According to Rabbeinu Tam that you need a shlish, Yosef could not have been obligated to listen because of mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis. The Maharsham (Chelek 2 Siman 224) also asks on this that it is against the Ramban. The Ramban in VaYechi only says Yosef had to listen because of kibud av. Why didn’t he mention the reason of mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis? Furtehrmore, the Maharsham says Tosafos in Kesuvos (86a) says it is only a din d’rabanan. The Shoeil U’Meishivb wants to say it is a taknah based on the idea of chesed shel emes.
How it Works
There is a machlokes Rishonim how this din works. The Machaneh Ephraim (Hil Zichiyah Siman 29) writes that Rashi (Gittin 14B) and Tosafos (Gittin 38a) both hold that it is a kinyan. In fact Rashi says that if Reuvein when he is healthy says to give Shimon $100, then if Reuvein dies Shimon immediately gets the $100 without any ma’aseh kinyan because of mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis. The Rashba (Gittin 38a) disagrees and holds mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis is just an obligation to carry out the wishes of the meis. The Ran and Ramban seem to agree with the Rashba. The nafka mina according to the Machaneh Ephraim is by yesomim ketanim. A katan would not have a chiyuv to carry out his father’s wishes but if it works a sa kinyan then he would have no choice since the m’kabeil gets it immediately. The Ketzos (248:5) also says it is not a kinyan because other wise you would have to explain how you can circumventthe dinei yerusha. (also ayin R’ Elchanan Kesuvos Siman 315)
There is another machlokes Rishonim whether you need a shlish, a 3rd party. Rabbeinu Tam (Gitttin 14a) holds you need a shlish but the Ramban and Ran hold you don’t. Al pi pashtus one would say this is toloi on th e above machlokes but I think I saw the Minchas Asher try and say it is two independent ideas. The Maharsham quotes a Teshuvas Rivash that the Ramban only holds you don’t need a shlish when the meis was a sh’chiv meira. If the meis was a healthy person, you even the Ramban holds you would need a shlish.
When Do We Say It
There is discussion in the poskin whether mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis. Is this solely a monetary issue or even applies to other areas. The Sh’vus Ya’akov (siman 165) says it is only a monetary issue but there is a lifnim m’shuras hadin to listen to the meis in non monetary issues. One of his proofs is from Ya’akov. Why did Yosef require a shevuah if there is a chiyuv of mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis? It must be that mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis only applies to monetary issues. The problem with this is that the Ramban clearly says the shevuah was to help Yosef convince Pharoah. The Maharshdam takes a middle road that there is a chiyuv by monetary issues and a mitzvah by non monetary issues. The Noda BeYehuda (Tenyana Siman 75) discuss this issue also and says if the request was not made to the person it affects there is no chiyuv to listen. The example was a father instructed his wife to marry their daughter to a certain person. Since the command was to the wife and not the daughter there is no mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis. (even if it was made to the daughter directly in this situation there is also no mitzvah l’kayeim divrei hameis.
Tuesday, January 02, 2007
Shehechiyanu On A New Talis
I bought a new talis teh other day and this naturally led to the question of whether you say a shehechiyanu and when do you say it.
The first issue is whether you say a shehechiyanu on a mitzva. The Rambam (berachos perek 11) lists 3 catagories of mitzvos where you say a shehechiyanu 1) mitzva done m'zman l'zman like sukkah and lulav b) mitzva that you acquire like tallis and tefilin c) mitzvah that is not tadir like pidyon haben and mila. (I am not sure exactly what the lomdus of the Rambam is). Tosafos (Sukkah 46A) writes that you need two requirements for a shehechiyanu on a mitzva. It has to be chashuv and bring you simchah and it has to be m'zman l'zman. Therefore, you don't say shehechiyanu on a new tallis or tefilin. (Again I am not sure what the lomdus in the machlokes is)
The Mechabeir paskens like Tosafos but he adds that since a talis is a new garment you can say shehechiyanu on the new talis for that reason. However, you would not say shehechiyanu on tefilin. The Magen Avraham agrees with this and the Taz is choleik and holds you would say shehechiyanu on tefilin (like the Rambam). Interestingly, although the EMchabeir holds like Tosafos, Tosafos himself rejects the idea that you say shehechiyanu on a talis because it is a new garment. According to Tosafos, you need the additional requirement of being m'zman l'zman.
As far as when to make the beracha, the Rema adds that you should make it when you put on the tzitzis. The Magen Avraham explains that really the shehechiyanu on a new beged should be made when you buy it. However, you don't make a shehechiyanu when you buy a beged which can't be worn right away. So if it needs to be tailored you make the shehechiyanu when you wear the beged (ayin Siman 223:4). Therefore, by a talis you can't wear the beged until the tzitzis are put on. Really the beracha should be made the first time you wear it. However, in order to be choshesh for the Rambam we make the shehechiyanu when we do the mitzvah of putting on the tzitzis.
Nireh Li, that l'ma'aseh it seems if one buys a talis in the store that has tzitzis then the shehechiyanu shoould be made when you buy it. If one didn't make the beracha at the time you bought it, it is clear you can make it when you wear it. The Pri Migadim actually says you can make it even after wearing it teh 2nd or 3rd time.
Finally, assuming you didn't make the beracha until you wear it, which beracha comes first, shehechiyanu or l'hisateif b'tzitzis? This is a machlokes haposkim. Teh Be'er Heitev quotes the Olas Tamid who says you make a shehechiyanu first. The Mishna Berura quotes the Pri Migadim as saying you make l'hisateif first. The Sha'arei Aharon points out that the problem with the Mishna Berura is that the Pri Migadim doesn't actually say this. In fact the Pri Migadim seems to imply you say the shehechiyanu first since he compares it to eating a new fruit and by the new fruit the Pri Migadim says to say shehechiyanu and then the berach aon the fruit. Furthermore, the Mishan Berura himself paskens by a new fruit to say shehechiyanu first. It is not clear why here would be any different. I think it could depend on whether you view the shehechiyanu as a hefsek but tzarich iyun on the Mishan Berura.
The first issue is whether you say a shehechiyanu on a mitzva. The Rambam (berachos perek 11) lists 3 catagories of mitzvos where you say a shehechiyanu 1) mitzva done m'zman l'zman like sukkah and lulav b) mitzva that you acquire like tallis and tefilin c) mitzvah that is not tadir like pidyon haben and mila. (I am not sure exactly what the lomdus of the Rambam is). Tosafos (Sukkah 46A) writes that you need two requirements for a shehechiyanu on a mitzva. It has to be chashuv and bring you simchah and it has to be m'zman l'zman. Therefore, you don't say shehechiyanu on a new tallis or tefilin. (Again I am not sure what the lomdus in the machlokes is)
The Mechabeir paskens like Tosafos but he adds that since a talis is a new garment you can say shehechiyanu on the new talis for that reason. However, you would not say shehechiyanu on tefilin. The Magen Avraham agrees with this and the Taz is choleik and holds you would say shehechiyanu on tefilin (like the Rambam). Interestingly, although the EMchabeir holds like Tosafos, Tosafos himself rejects the idea that you say shehechiyanu on a talis because it is a new garment. According to Tosafos, you need the additional requirement of being m'zman l'zman.
As far as when to make the beracha, the Rema adds that you should make it when you put on the tzitzis. The Magen Avraham explains that really the shehechiyanu on a new beged should be made when you buy it. However, you don't make a shehechiyanu when you buy a beged which can't be worn right away. So if it needs to be tailored you make the shehechiyanu when you wear the beged (ayin Siman 223:4). Therefore, by a talis you can't wear the beged until the tzitzis are put on. Really the beracha should be made the first time you wear it. However, in order to be choshesh for the Rambam we make the shehechiyanu when we do the mitzvah of putting on the tzitzis.
Nireh Li, that l'ma'aseh it seems if one buys a talis in the store that has tzitzis then the shehechiyanu shoould be made when you buy it. If one didn't make the beracha at the time you bought it, it is clear you can make it when you wear it. The Pri Migadim actually says you can make it even after wearing it teh 2nd or 3rd time.
Finally, assuming you didn't make the beracha until you wear it, which beracha comes first, shehechiyanu or l'hisateif b'tzitzis? This is a machlokes haposkim. Teh Be'er Heitev quotes the Olas Tamid who says you make a shehechiyanu first. The Mishna Berura quotes the Pri Migadim as saying you make l'hisateif first. The Sha'arei Aharon points out that the problem with the Mishna Berura is that the Pri Migadim doesn't actually say this. In fact the Pri Migadim seems to imply you say the shehechiyanu first since he compares it to eating a new fruit and by the new fruit the Pri Migadim says to say shehechiyanu and then the berach aon the fruit. Furthermore, the Mishan Berura himself paskens by a new fruit to say shehechiyanu first. It is not clear why here would be any different. I think it could depend on whether you view the shehechiyanu as a hefsek but tzarich iyun on the Mishan Berura.
Thursday, December 28, 2006
Happy Anniversary
Today is the one year anniversary of my blog. I must admit I am surprised I have been around this long.
Monday, December 18, 2006
The Pri Migadim and Tadir
As mentioned previously, R'Chaim Brown has a post about hadlakas menorah and tadir v'sh'eino tadir.
I would just like to add 2 points to the discussion.
1) The Pri Migadim in Siman 689 writes that really Ner Shabbos should be lit before Ner Chanukah due to tadir. We don't do it like this because we are m'kabeil Shabbos when we light Ner Shabbos. He gives an eitzah of how to remove this problem of tadir by saying that you should not have the Shabbos candles set up when you light the Menorah. Then you have no shailah of tadir.
The question I have on this is it seems the Pri Migadim holds that tadir doesn't apply if it is a z'man chiyuv for two mitzvos. Rather it only applies if both mitzvos are mamash in front of you. When you light Ner Chanukah, isn't it also the z'man for lighting Ner Shabbos? What difference does it make if the Shabbos candles are not set out in front of you. It is still the z'man for lighting Shabbos candles.
Also, would it make a difference if the Shabbos candles are in one room and the Chanukah candles in a different room? L'fi the Pri Migadim would that be an issue of tadir?
2) There is a shittah (I believe that both R' Moshe and R' Ahron Kotler held this way) to light the menorah around 15-20 minutes after sh'kiah. The question is , would it be necessary to daven ma'ariv beforehand or since it is not the z'man for ma'ariv there is no issue of tadir.
I would just like to add 2 points to the discussion.
1) The Pri Migadim in Siman 689 writes that really Ner Shabbos should be lit before Ner Chanukah due to tadir. We don't do it like this because we are m'kabeil Shabbos when we light Ner Shabbos. He gives an eitzah of how to remove this problem of tadir by saying that you should not have the Shabbos candles set up when you light the Menorah. Then you have no shailah of tadir.
The question I have on this is it seems the Pri Migadim holds that tadir doesn't apply if it is a z'man chiyuv for two mitzvos. Rather it only applies if both mitzvos are mamash in front of you. When you light Ner Chanukah, isn't it also the z'man for lighting Ner Shabbos? What difference does it make if the Shabbos candles are not set out in front of you. It is still the z'man for lighting Shabbos candles.
Also, would it make a difference if the Shabbos candles are in one room and the Chanukah candles in a different room? L'fi the Pri Migadim would that be an issue of tadir?
2) There is a shittah (I believe that both R' Moshe and R' Ahron Kotler held this way) to light the menorah around 15-20 minutes after sh'kiah. The question is , would it be necessary to daven ma'ariv beforehand or since it is not the z'man for ma'ariv there is no issue of tadir.
Friday, December 15, 2006
Hadlakas Menorah on Erev Shabbos
My good friend R'Chaim Brown has a post about hadlakas menorah on Erev Shabbos as viewed through the lens of tadir v'sh'eino tadir.
I would like to look at it through a different angle.
Here are a few questions.
1) We pasken that Ner Chanukah is before Ner Shabbos. Why don't we say that the woman of the house should first light Ner Shabbos and tehn the husband can light Ner Chanukah since the husband is not m'kabeil Shabbos when his wife lights Shabbos candles. Also, a woman who lights Shabbos candles can ask her husband to do melacha for her.
2) When we light candles Erev Shabbos before Sh'kiah is that considered the z'man hadlakah? If it is not the z'man hadlaka and we only light before sh'kiah because ein berierah then how does this work since we hold hadlaka oseh mitzva. We are lighting before the z'man chiyuv and we l'chorah didn't do a proper hadlakah.
I don'thave time to answer these questions now but here are a few mareh mekomos to chew on.
1) Siman 679 and nosei keilim there
2) Siman 673:2 and the Taz in 673:2
3) The Ran and Shitas B'Hag on the sugyah of kavsa ein zakuk lah
4) Terumas HaDeshen Siman 102
5) Shut Pri Yitzchak Chelk 2 Siman 8
I would like to look at it through a different angle.
Here are a few questions.
1) We pasken that Ner Chanukah is before Ner Shabbos. Why don't we say that the woman of the house should first light Ner Shabbos and tehn the husband can light Ner Chanukah since the husband is not m'kabeil Shabbos when his wife lights Shabbos candles. Also, a woman who lights Shabbos candles can ask her husband to do melacha for her.
2) When we light candles Erev Shabbos before Sh'kiah is that considered the z'man hadlakah? If it is not the z'man hadlaka and we only light before sh'kiah because ein berierah then how does this work since we hold hadlaka oseh mitzva. We are lighting before the z'man chiyuv and we l'chorah didn't do a proper hadlakah.
I don'thave time to answer these questions now but here are a few mareh mekomos to chew on.
1) Siman 679 and nosei keilim there
2) Siman 673:2 and the Taz in 673:2
3) The Ran and Shitas B'Hag on the sugyah of kavsa ein zakuk lah
4) Terumas HaDeshen Siman 102
5) Shut Pri Yitzchak Chelk 2 Siman 8
Wednesday, December 13, 2006
Parshas VaYishlach:Hakamas HaMatzeivah
Last week's shiur dealt with the issue of putting up a matzeivah. The obvious m'kor for this inyan is this past week's parshas when Yaakpv put up a matzeivah for Rochel. However, it i snot so pashut that this is the m'kor.
There are 2 gemaras that deal with the sugyah. The gemara in Moed Katan learns that it is a halacha l'moshe m'sinai to mark the graves so a kohein won't become tamei. However, from this gemara all you see is that there is an inyan to mark the graves and not put up a matzeiva. There is also a Yerushalmi in Shekalim (2:9) that has a machlokes over what to do with the leftover money collected for a meis. Do you give it to the yorshim or do you build a matzeiva. The gemara has a third opinion that you don't build a matzeiva for tzaddikim since their ma'asim serve as their rememberance.
The Rambam paskens like this third shittah which then leads to the question why was Yaakov putting up a matzeiva and why do we build matzeivos for tzaddikim.
The Ksav Sofer answers that there are really 2 reasons for a matzeiva. One is for the meis, so that people will be able to daven for the niftar by his kever. The second reason is for the people who are alive to enable them to visit the kever. When the Yerushalmi said we don't build a matzeiva for tzaddikim, it meant because reason #1 doesn't apply, there is no chiuv to build it. However, if one wants to they could because of reason #2.
Rav Moshe has a similar answer in Y.D. chelek 4. He says Ya'akov built the matzeiva not because of kovod to Rochel but so that future generations would be able to find it. There is no issur to build a matzeiva for tzaddikim but it is not a chiyuv. He also adds that the whole binyan on Kever Rochel b'zman hazeh is definately not l'kovod Rochel but it was built to make it easier to daven there. Interestingly, in an earlier teshuva in Y.D. chelek 3, Rav Moshe gives a different answer. He says that certain dinim that only pertain to tzaddikim don't apply today and this is one of them.
In general we see that it wasn't always the minhag to put up a matzeiva. The poskim discuss cases where the minhag hamokom was not to put up a matzeiva, are you allowed to collect money to put one up or is it solely up to the yorshim. However, Rav Moshe writes that b'zman hazeh it is definately a chiyuv of kovod hameis, both here and in EY since this is how the minhag has evolved. However, it is not on teh same level of a chiyuv as oteh rtzarchei hameis. I am not sure if Rav Moshe means to say that although we collect money for tzarchei hameis, building a matzeiva is not included.
Finally, one last point. The Maharam Shik screams against the minhag of putting a secular date on a matzeivah. A matzeivah represents the idea that the nefesh will come back. A secular date is antithetical to this idea. Also, reading a secular date is an issur d'oreisa of avoda zara and by putting a secular date on a matzeivah you are causing people to be nichshal. (I wonder what the minhag is in different circles regarding secular dates)
There are 2 gemaras that deal with the sugyah. The gemara in Moed Katan learns that it is a halacha l'moshe m'sinai to mark the graves so a kohein won't become tamei. However, from this gemara all you see is that there is an inyan to mark the graves and not put up a matzeiva. There is also a Yerushalmi in Shekalim (2:9) that has a machlokes over what to do with the leftover money collected for a meis. Do you give it to the yorshim or do you build a matzeiva. The gemara has a third opinion that you don't build a matzeiva for tzaddikim since their ma'asim serve as their rememberance.
The Rambam paskens like this third shittah which then leads to the question why was Yaakov putting up a matzeiva and why do we build matzeivos for tzaddikim.
The Ksav Sofer answers that there are really 2 reasons for a matzeiva. One is for the meis, so that people will be able to daven for the niftar by his kever. The second reason is for the people who are alive to enable them to visit the kever. When the Yerushalmi said we don't build a matzeiva for tzaddikim, it meant because reason #1 doesn't apply, there is no chiuv to build it. However, if one wants to they could because of reason #2.
Rav Moshe has a similar answer in Y.D. chelek 4. He says Ya'akov built the matzeiva not because of kovod to Rochel but so that future generations would be able to find it. There is no issur to build a matzeiva for tzaddikim but it is not a chiyuv. He also adds that the whole binyan on Kever Rochel b'zman hazeh is definately not l'kovod Rochel but it was built to make it easier to daven there. Interestingly, in an earlier teshuva in Y.D. chelek 3, Rav Moshe gives a different answer. He says that certain dinim that only pertain to tzaddikim don't apply today and this is one of them.
In general we see that it wasn't always the minhag to put up a matzeiva. The poskim discuss cases where the minhag hamokom was not to put up a matzeiva, are you allowed to collect money to put one up or is it solely up to the yorshim. However, Rav Moshe writes that b'zman hazeh it is definately a chiyuv of kovod hameis, both here and in EY since this is how the minhag has evolved. However, it is not on teh same level of a chiyuv as oteh rtzarchei hameis. I am not sure if Rav Moshe means to say that although we collect money for tzarchei hameis, building a matzeiva is not included.
Finally, one last point. The Maharam Shik screams against the minhag of putting a secular date on a matzeivah. A matzeivah represents the idea that the nefesh will come back. A secular date is antithetical to this idea. Also, reading a secular date is an issur d'oreisa of avoda zara and by putting a secular date on a matzeivah you are causing people to be nichshal. (I wonder what the minhag is in different circles regarding secular dates)
Monday, December 11, 2006
Renting A House In Order To Light Menorah
I saw a teshuva from Rav Chaim Kanievsky regarding someone who doesn't have a house, does he have a chiyuv to rent a house so he can light the Menorah. Rav Chaim Kanievsky wantedto pasken you have no chiyuv and the rayah is from the fact that Chazal were m'sakein birchas haro'eh for someone not lighting (ayin Rashi). He then quotes his father in law Rav Elyashiv, that there would be a chiyuv. The rayah from birchas haro'eh is not a rayah because that is a case of oneis.
Rav Chaim Kanievsky then says it could be a machlokes Rishonim. Tosafos in Sukkah equates hadlakas menorah to mezuzah and there is no chiyuv to rent a house to put up a mezuzah. However, the Rambam in Hilchos Berachos writes there are two types of mitzvos. One catagory is a "chovah" that you are obligated to run after like tefillin and lulav. The other catagory you only do if circumstances dictate it like mezuzah or ma'akeh. Then the Rambam says these two catagories apply on a d'rabanan level as well and he puts hadlakas menorah in the "chovah" catagory. This seems to indicate you would have to go out of your way to light the menorah (including renting a house so you could light).
Rav Chaim Kanievsky then says it could be a machlokes Rishonim. Tosafos in Sukkah equates hadlakas menorah to mezuzah and there is no chiyuv to rent a house to put up a mezuzah. However, the Rambam in Hilchos Berachos writes there are two types of mitzvos. One catagory is a "chovah" that you are obligated to run after like tefillin and lulav. The other catagory you only do if circumstances dictate it like mezuzah or ma'akeh. Then the Rambam says these two catagories apply on a d'rabanan level as well and he puts hadlakas menorah in the "chovah" catagory. This seems to indicate you would have to go out of your way to light the menorah (including renting a house so you could light).
Siyum Mazal Tov
For the last 4 1/2 years I have been learning mishnayos on the train during the morning commute with several people. This past Motzei Shabbos we finally made a siyum on Shas Mishnayos. Mazal Tov to everyone involved and if anyone wants to join us, just come to the front car of the 8:19 train out of Passaic.
Wednesday, December 06, 2006
Parshas VaYeitzei:Talmud Torah and Kibbud Av V'Eim
This past weeks shiur was about whether talmud torah is doche kibbud av v'eim.
The gemara in the end of the first perek of Megillah says that Ya'akov wasn't punished for being away from home for the 14 years he spent in Yeshiva. From here we see that "godol talmud torah m'kibud av v'eim"
In siman 240 the Mechabeir paskens "godol talmud torah m'kibud av v'eim".
The question is what are the parameters of this halacha.
There are three different scenarios which have to be addressed.
Scenario 1: Stopping your learning to serve your parent:
The Perisha (YD 240) writes that if you are learning and your parent asks for a drink of water you don't have to stop since "godol talmud torah m'kibud av v'eim". The Pischei Teshuva (YD 240:8) quotes the Pri Chadosh who disagrees. "godol talmud torah m'kibud av v'eim" only allows you to leave town and avoid kibbud av but in our case you must stop your learning. The Pischei Teshuva points you to YD siman 246 and I understand him to be saying that in this case kibbud av is no different then any other mitzvah. In siman 246 the Shulchan Aruch paskens that you must stop learning to do a mitzvah which no one else can do. kibbud av is no different then any other mitzvah and since noone else can do it you must stop learning.
Scenario 2: Leaving town to learn and avoiding the mitzvah of kibbud av:
As mentioned above the Pri Chadosh holds that this is what the statement "godol talmud torah m'kibud av v'eim" refers to. Noone seems to disagree with this. The only question is, why is leaving town to learn docheh kibud av, but if you are in the same town you must stop learning.
I thought you could answer t he following. We find that talmud torah can be docheh the chiyuv to get married. Rav Moshe in the Dibbros Moshe Kiddushin Siman 43 explains that there are two facets to learning, quantity and quality. If someone feels that his quality of learning will be affected he is patur from getting married. Perhaps the same idea can be applied here. To stop learning for 5 minutes and get your parent a drink won't affect the quality of your learning, but if you can't leave town and go to the Yeshiva of your choice that definately impacts your quality of learning. The Minchas Ahsher has a similar sevara but he phrases it a little differently. ayin sham.
Scenario 3: Leaving town to learn against your parents wishes:
The Shulchan Aruch brings this as a separate halacha in 240:25. The question would be why is it necessary to have 2 separate halachos. Also, the other question is is this a violation of kibbud av v'eim? Who says there is an obligation to listen to ones's parents. I recently heard a shiur from Rabbi Willig where he quoted a Gur Aryeh in Kedoshim that not listening to one's parents is a violation of moreh av. Just like you can't contradict your parents, so too you would need to listen to them. Obviously there are (many) situations where this would not apply but the point is that from a halachic perspective one has to take into account the violation of moreh av v'eim.
The Terumas HaDeshen(quoted by the Shulchan Aruch) writes that in this case one does not have to listen to one's parents and you can go away to a Yeshiva against their will.
Contemporary Poskim
I was given in article on this subject and the article quotes Rav Zilberstien as paskening that if your father is sick and he wants you to visit him then if you are in town you must go. If you are learning out of town you don'thave to go. However, if there is noone to take care of your parent you must go.
Rav Shternbuch is quoted as saying that if you are in the same town you must help your parents. However, if it will really affect your learning then you are pattur. (which seems like a rayah to my chiluk of quality vs quantity). Also, if your parent is sick you must help even if they are out of town but you shoul dtry to minimize the bittul torah as much as possible.
The gemara in the end of the first perek of Megillah says that Ya'akov wasn't punished for being away from home for the 14 years he spent in Yeshiva. From here we see that "godol talmud torah m'kibud av v'eim"
In siman 240 the Mechabeir paskens "godol talmud torah m'kibud av v'eim".
The question is what are the parameters of this halacha.
There are three different scenarios which have to be addressed.
Scenario 1: Stopping your learning to serve your parent:
The Perisha (YD 240) writes that if you are learning and your parent asks for a drink of water you don't have to stop since "godol talmud torah m'kibud av v'eim". The Pischei Teshuva (YD 240:8) quotes the Pri Chadosh who disagrees. "godol talmud torah m'kibud av v'eim" only allows you to leave town and avoid kibbud av but in our case you must stop your learning. The Pischei Teshuva points you to YD siman 246 and I understand him to be saying that in this case kibbud av is no different then any other mitzvah. In siman 246 the Shulchan Aruch paskens that you must stop learning to do a mitzvah which no one else can do. kibbud av is no different then any other mitzvah and since noone else can do it you must stop learning.
Scenario 2: Leaving town to learn and avoiding the mitzvah of kibbud av:
As mentioned above the Pri Chadosh holds that this is what the statement "godol talmud torah m'kibud av v'eim" refers to. Noone seems to disagree with this. The only question is, why is leaving town to learn docheh kibud av, but if you are in the same town you must stop learning.
I thought you could answer t he following. We find that talmud torah can be docheh the chiyuv to get married. Rav Moshe in the Dibbros Moshe Kiddushin Siman 43 explains that there are two facets to learning, quantity and quality. If someone feels that his quality of learning will be affected he is patur from getting married. Perhaps the same idea can be applied here. To stop learning for 5 minutes and get your parent a drink won't affect the quality of your learning, but if you can't leave town and go to the Yeshiva of your choice that definately impacts your quality of learning. The Minchas Ahsher has a similar sevara but he phrases it a little differently. ayin sham.
Scenario 3: Leaving town to learn against your parents wishes:
The Shulchan Aruch brings this as a separate halacha in 240:25. The question would be why is it necessary to have 2 separate halachos. Also, the other question is is this a violation of kibbud av v'eim? Who says there is an obligation to listen to ones's parents. I recently heard a shiur from Rabbi Willig where he quoted a Gur Aryeh in Kedoshim that not listening to one's parents is a violation of moreh av. Just like you can't contradict your parents, so too you would need to listen to them. Obviously there are (many) situations where this would not apply but the point is that from a halachic perspective one has to take into account the violation of moreh av v'eim.
The Terumas HaDeshen(quoted by the Shulchan Aruch) writes that in this case one does not have to listen to one's parents and you can go away to a Yeshiva against their will.
Contemporary Poskim
I was given in article on this subject and the article quotes Rav Zilberstien as paskening that if your father is sick and he wants you to visit him then if you are in town you must go. If you are learning out of town you don'thave to go. However, if there is noone to take care of your parent you must go.
Rav Shternbuch is quoted as saying that if you are in the same town you must help your parents. However, if it will really affect your learning then you are pattur. (which seems like a rayah to my chiluk of quality vs quantity). Also, if your parent is sick you must help even if they are out of town but you shoul dtry to minimize the bittul torah as much as possible.
Tuesday, November 28, 2006
Standing For A Parent
In looking at Hilchos Kibbud Av V'Eim (Y.D. 240) I noticed something interesting. The Shulchan Aruch list those activities that constitute honoring and fearing a parent. However, standing for a parent is not part of the list. It is a separate halacha listed later. Why is that? Furthermore, the Shulchan Aruch paskens that one is obligated to honor his father in law. Would this include standing up for him?
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