y good friend the Divrei Chaim has a post discussing the issue of Chazal adding an extra criteria to a mitzvah. This reminded me of something I saw this past Shabbos in a sefer Ohr L'Avraham on Chanuka by Rav Avraham Gurwitz (Rosh Yeshiva of Gateshead). He discusses the question of whether one would make a beracha on Megillas Antiochus in those communities that read it. If I remember correctly this is what he says. The consensus was not to make a beracha. The question is why would this be any different then making a beracha on Hallel Rosh Chodesh or Haftorah on a Ta'anis? He answers that it depends on how we view the takana? If it is based on a previous din then it would require a beracha. Therefore, Hallel on Rosh Chodesh is based on Hallel on Yom Tov and the Haftorah during the week is based on the Haftorah on Shabbos. Therefore, we make a beracha. However, reading Megillas Antiochus is a new minhag and not based on anything and therefore does not require a beracha.
Although he doesn't say it in so many words, I believe he is saying that it is a question of extension vs creation. If the minhag is an extension of the old din we can make a beracha but if it is a new din by itself (creation) we don't make a beracha.
NOTE: I am writing from memory and I could be missing some nuances. If it doesn't make sense it is my fault.
Tuesday, November 28, 2006
Wednesday, November 22, 2006
Mitzvas Kesivas Sefer Torah
There is a lot to say on this topic, but here is one ha'arah. Rashi in Menachos (30A) holds that you are yotzei the mitzvah if you buy a sefer torah. The achronim (ayin Minchas Chinuch mitzvah 613) ask that the gemara in Sanhedrin (22b) says you are not yotzei the mitzvah if you inherit a sefeer torah. What's the difference whether you buy it or inherit it?
The simple answer would be that when you are buying it, you are doing something, making a hishtadlus to get it. Inheriting it doesn't require any effort. I saw in a sefer a sevarah to why this chiluk would be true. The mechaber of the sefer writes that he heard from R' Elchanan Wasserman that the torah doesn't require a person to write a get himself because if it did then a person with no hands could never get divorced. (Shlichus would not help since there is no chalos involved, unlike teh nesina where you can rely on shlichus). This same idea can be applied to kesivas sefer torah. If the torah required that you must write the sefer torah, then how could someone with no hands write a sefer torah. It must be that all the torah requires is that you expend effort to get a sefer torah. This is accomplished by buying it.
Just curious if any of the lamdanim out there like this sevara.
The simple answer would be that when you are buying it, you are doing something, making a hishtadlus to get it. Inheriting it doesn't require any effort. I saw in a sefer a sevarah to why this chiluk would be true. The mechaber of the sefer writes that he heard from R' Elchanan Wasserman that the torah doesn't require a person to write a get himself because if it did then a person with no hands could never get divorced. (Shlichus would not help since there is no chalos involved, unlike teh nesina where you can rely on shlichus). This same idea can be applied to kesivas sefer torah. If the torah required that you must write the sefer torah, then how could someone with no hands write a sefer torah. It must be that all the torah requires is that you expend effort to get a sefer torah. This is accomplished by buying it.
Just curious if any of the lamdanim out there like this sevara.
Monday, November 20, 2006
Parshas Chaya Sara: Ein HKBH Meivi Takala L'Tzaddikim
This weeks chaburah was on the topic of "ein HKBH meivi takala l'tzaddikim", Hashem will see to it that tzaddikim don't sin.
Machlokes Rashi and Ramban
After Eliezer meets Rivkah, it says in the possuk (24:32) "vayiftach hagemalim". The question is, what does this mean. Rashi explains that Eliezer unmuzzled his camels. Until now the animals had muzzles on so they wouldn't eat grass that didn't belong to them. The Ramban quotes a medrash that asks, why would we assume that the camels would "steal" grass? The gemara in Chullin 7a describes how the donkey of R' Pinchas ben Yair refused to eat tevel and how we see from here that HKBH will prevent the animal of a tzaddik, and kol sh'kein a tzaddik himself from doing an aveirah. Why wouldn't this also apply to Avraham and his camels? Therefore, the Ramban explains that "vayiftach hagemalim" means that the animals were tied together and Eliezer untied them.
Understanding the Machlokes
Shittas Tosafos
Tosafos in Chullin (5B) asks that how can the gemara say that HKBH will prevent a tzaddik from doing an aveirah, we see many cases in the gemara where an amora did an aveirah. (ayin sham for examples). Tosafos answers that this klal only applies by food related aveiras, in other words where the aveirah comes from eating forbidden foods. Since these aveiros are more chamur than other aveiros, Hashem will see to it that a tzaddik not stumble. I saw two reasons given for this. One reason is that ma'achalos asuros is m'tamteim the lev. The second reason is given by the Meromei Sadeh in Yoma that a person's body is made up of the food he eats and Hashem does not want a tzaddik to have this food in his system.
Shitta HaRan
The Ran argues on Tosafos and says that if the tzaddik is posheia-he negligently places himself in a position to do an aveirah, so then he won't be protected. Hashem will protect a tzaddik for any aveirah if he does his best not to do the aveirah.
Shut Marhasham
With this the Maharsham explains the machlokes between the Ramban and Rashi. Rashi holds like Tosafos. Since stealing is not a food related aveirah, Avraham would not be protected and his camels might eat stolen grass. Therefore, they had to be muzzled. The Ramban holds like the Ran that this klal applies by all aveiros and there was no need to muzzle the camels.
Rav Elchanan's Teretz
R' Elchanan in Kovetz Shiurim (Chullin Siman 112) has another answer. He writes that both Rashi and Ramban hold like Tosafos that the klal applies only to food aveiros. However, the question is does a stolen item turn into a cheftzah shel issur. According to the Ramban, the stolen grass becomes a cheftzah shel issur and if teh animals would eat it they would be doing an aveirah with food. Therefore, Hashem would prevent Avraham from being nicshal in this aveirah and there is no need to muzzle the animals. Rashi holds it doesn't become a cheftzah shel issur and it is necessary to muzzle the animals.
Another Nafka Mina
I saw brought down in a sefer Chavatzels HaSharon on the parsha that this question of whether a stolen iten becomes a cheftzah shel issur could have another nafka mina. The Biur Halacha is mesupak over the following case. Reuvein steals tztitzis strings from Shimon and attaches it to his beged. Then he pays Shimon for the stolen strings. Is this a chisaron of ta'aseh v'lo min ha'asoy. L'chorah you can claim that the shailah can only start if you assume the stolen strings become a cheftzah shel issur. (ayin afikei yam chelek 2 siman 31).
Machlokes Rashi and Ramban
After Eliezer meets Rivkah, it says in the possuk (24:32) "vayiftach hagemalim". The question is, what does this mean. Rashi explains that Eliezer unmuzzled his camels. Until now the animals had muzzles on so they wouldn't eat grass that didn't belong to them. The Ramban quotes a medrash that asks, why would we assume that the camels would "steal" grass? The gemara in Chullin 7a describes how the donkey of R' Pinchas ben Yair refused to eat tevel and how we see from here that HKBH will prevent the animal of a tzaddik, and kol sh'kein a tzaddik himself from doing an aveirah. Why wouldn't this also apply to Avraham and his camels? Therefore, the Ramban explains that "vayiftach hagemalim" means that the animals were tied together and Eliezer untied them.
Understanding the Machlokes
Shittas Tosafos
Tosafos in Chullin (5B) asks that how can the gemara say that HKBH will prevent a tzaddik from doing an aveirah, we see many cases in the gemara where an amora did an aveirah. (ayin sham for examples). Tosafos answers that this klal only applies by food related aveiras, in other words where the aveirah comes from eating forbidden foods. Since these aveiros are more chamur than other aveiros, Hashem will see to it that a tzaddik not stumble. I saw two reasons given for this. One reason is that ma'achalos asuros is m'tamteim the lev. The second reason is given by the Meromei Sadeh in Yoma that a person's body is made up of the food he eats and Hashem does not want a tzaddik to have this food in his system.
Shitta HaRan
The Ran argues on Tosafos and says that if the tzaddik is posheia-he negligently places himself in a position to do an aveirah, so then he won't be protected. Hashem will protect a tzaddik for any aveirah if he does his best not to do the aveirah.
Shut Marhasham
With this the Maharsham explains the machlokes between the Ramban and Rashi. Rashi holds like Tosafos. Since stealing is not a food related aveirah, Avraham would not be protected and his camels might eat stolen grass. Therefore, they had to be muzzled. The Ramban holds like the Ran that this klal applies by all aveiros and there was no need to muzzle the camels.
Rav Elchanan's Teretz
R' Elchanan in Kovetz Shiurim (Chullin Siman 112) has another answer. He writes that both Rashi and Ramban hold like Tosafos that the klal applies only to food aveiros. However, the question is does a stolen item turn into a cheftzah shel issur. According to the Ramban, the stolen grass becomes a cheftzah shel issur and if teh animals would eat it they would be doing an aveirah with food. Therefore, Hashem would prevent Avraham from being nicshal in this aveirah and there is no need to muzzle the animals. Rashi holds it doesn't become a cheftzah shel issur and it is necessary to muzzle the animals.
Another Nafka Mina
I saw brought down in a sefer Chavatzels HaSharon on the parsha that this question of whether a stolen iten becomes a cheftzah shel issur could have another nafka mina. The Biur Halacha is mesupak over the following case. Reuvein steals tztitzis strings from Shimon and attaches it to his beged. Then he pays Shimon for the stolen strings. Is this a chisaron of ta'aseh v'lo min ha'asoy. L'chorah you can claim that the shailah can only start if you assume the stolen strings become a cheftzah shel issur. (ayin afikei yam chelek 2 siman 31).
Wednesday, November 08, 2006
He'oros On The Akeidah
I was looking through the Minchas Asher on this weeks parsha and he had some interesting he'oros from a halachic perspective.
Here are a couple.
1) Why did Avraham not ride on the donkey all the way to Har HaMoriah?
Chazal say that the Akeidah took place on Yom Kippur. Therefore, it would be assur to ride an animal for fear of breaking a branch. Furthermore, even though two people can ride an animal because they will remind each other not to tear off any branches, Avraham realized that on the way back he would be by himself.
Another answer is that there is a whole discussion in the Shagas Aryeh whether shevisas beheima applies to Yom Tov and Yom Kippur. Avraham was being choshesh for shuch a shitta.
2) Why did Yitzchak not ask where the animal for the korbon was until they got within eyesight of Har Hamoriah.
It is only assur to bring a chayah on the mizbeiyach. On a bama it is muttar. Yitzchak thought they were going to bring a korbon on a bama so he figured they would catch an naimal in the forest. When he saw the mokom hamikdash he realized the korbon would be brought on the mokom hamizbeiyach and they would need a beheimah. So he asked where the animal was.
The Meshech Chochma in Parshas Noach explains the reason for the difference between the mizbeiyach and bama. The Torah didn't want anyone getting hurt/killed by chasing an animal in the forest. Therefore, only beheimos could be brought on the mizbeiyach. The Meshech Chachma explains that this did not apply to Noach after the mabul. Noach brought chayos on the mokom mizbeiyach. Since all the animals were there already there was no chashash that he would get hurt chasing them.
Here are a couple.
1) Why did Avraham not ride on the donkey all the way to Har HaMoriah?
Chazal say that the Akeidah took place on Yom Kippur. Therefore, it would be assur to ride an animal for fear of breaking a branch. Furthermore, even though two people can ride an animal because they will remind each other not to tear off any branches, Avraham realized that on the way back he would be by himself.
Another answer is that there is a whole discussion in the Shagas Aryeh whether shevisas beheima applies to Yom Tov and Yom Kippur. Avraham was being choshesh for shuch a shitta.
2) Why did Yitzchak not ask where the animal for the korbon was until they got within eyesight of Har Hamoriah.
It is only assur to bring a chayah on the mizbeiyach. On a bama it is muttar. Yitzchak thought they were going to bring a korbon on a bama so he figured they would catch an naimal in the forest. When he saw the mokom hamikdash he realized the korbon would be brought on the mokom hamizbeiyach and they would need a beheimah. So he asked where the animal was.
The Meshech Chochma in Parshas Noach explains the reason for the difference between the mizbeiyach and bama. The Torah didn't want anyone getting hurt/killed by chasing an animal in the forest. Therefore, only beheimos could be brought on the mizbeiyach. The Meshech Chachma explains that this did not apply to Noach after the mabul. Noach brought chayos on the mokom mizbeiyach. Since all the animals were there already there was no chashash that he would get hurt chasing them.
Mila: What Was Avraham Waiting For
Various achronim discuss the kasha, why did Avraham not give himself a bris mila before Hashem commanded him to. If Avraham kept the whole torah, he should have given himself a bris right away.
There are a number of interesting answers to this kasha.
1) Brisker Rav: The classic Brisker answer is that Avraham didn't have a "shem oreil" until the command. If he didn't have a "shem oreil" then there would be no reason to give himself a bris
2) The Hafla'ah in Panim Yafos writes that there is an issur chavalah on a ben Noach. As long as there was no command to give himself a bris, it would have been chavalah to do so. Therefore, Avraham had to wait for the command.
One could ask that Avraham could have done the mitzvah as an aino mitzuva v'oseh and that should be enough to remove the issur chavala. L'chorah you have to be say that Avraham had dinim of a ben Noach l'chumrah and he had to be machmir and not be oveir the issur chavala even though he could have done the mitzvah as an aino mitzuva v'oseh.
3) The Sefas Emes writes that the sod of mila was so great that Avraham didn't understand it until Hahsem explained it to him. Using this S'fas Emes perhaps we can say that the reason Avraham didn't do mila is because he wasn't even aware teh mitzvah existed. Every other mitzvah Avrham figured out on his own. When it came to mila, Avraham couldn't figure it out until Hashem told him about it.
4) A saw another chassidishe answer similar to what I wrote in #3. Each mitzva is k'negged an eiver in aperson's body. However, when it came to mila, the orlah blocked the kedusha of that eiver and prevented Avraham from realizing there was a mitzva of mila.
5) Mila is a k'risus bris. A bris needs two parties. If Avraham did the mila on his own, there wouldn't have been a k'risus bris
There are a number of interesting answers to this kasha.
1) Brisker Rav: The classic Brisker answer is that Avraham didn't have a "shem oreil" until the command. If he didn't have a "shem oreil" then there would be no reason to give himself a bris
2) The Hafla'ah in Panim Yafos writes that there is an issur chavalah on a ben Noach. As long as there was no command to give himself a bris, it would have been chavalah to do so. Therefore, Avraham had to wait for the command.
One could ask that Avraham could have done the mitzvah as an aino mitzuva v'oseh and that should be enough to remove the issur chavala. L'chorah you have to be say that Avraham had dinim of a ben Noach l'chumrah and he had to be machmir and not be oveir the issur chavala even though he could have done the mitzvah as an aino mitzuva v'oseh.
3) The Sefas Emes writes that the sod of mila was so great that Avraham didn't understand it until Hahsem explained it to him. Using this S'fas Emes perhaps we can say that the reason Avraham didn't do mila is because he wasn't even aware teh mitzvah existed. Every other mitzvah Avrham figured out on his own. When it came to mila, Avraham couldn't figure it out until Hashem told him about it.
4) A saw another chassidishe answer similar to what I wrote in #3. Each mitzva is k'negged an eiver in aperson's body. However, when it came to mila, the orlah blocked the kedusha of that eiver and prevented Avraham from realizing there was a mitzva of mila.
5) Mila is a k'risus bris. A bris needs two parties. If Avraham did the mila on his own, there wouldn't have been a k'risus bris
Monday, October 30, 2006
Parshas Noach:The Status of A Ger Toshav
This weeks chaburah was on understanding the status of a ger toshav.
Note: Due to the nature of this topic I am being m'katzeir and providing mareh m'komos. v'hameivin yavin. (If you can convince me that I am being overly sensitive I will provide greater detail).
The gemara in Avodah Zara (65b) brings a machlokes in understanding what makes a ben noach into a ger toshav. The Rambam (Hil Avodas Kochavim perek 10 and Hil Issurei Biah 14:7) paskens like the chachamim that a ger toshav is a ben noach who accepts on himself in from of a beis din that he will keep the 7 mitzvos b'nei noach. The Rambam also adds (Issurei Biah and in Melachim Perek 8) that one who accepts on himself to be a ger toshav is from the chasidei umos ha'olam and gets olam haba. However, if a ben noach keeps the 7 mitzvos on his own then he does not get the special status of a ger toshav.
The Ritva in Makkos (9B) also writes something similar ayin sham. A ger toshav is a metzuvah v'oseh and a ben noach is aino metzuvah v'oseh.
In terms of what special laws apply to a ger toshav, ayin the Chazon Ish Baba Kama Siman 10:16.
The Brisker Rav (mechtavim in Chiddushei HaGriz, last letter) explains that the status of ger toshav was created after mattan torah and he bases this on the gemara Baba Kama 38a and the Ritva mentioned above.
The lomdus boils down to whether it is a real geirus or just a kabbalah in beis din. The Brisker Rav feels it is just a kabbalah to keep teh 7 mitzvos and it brings with it certain dinim. The Mishans Ya'avetz (Y.D. Siman 3) brings many ra,ayos to show it is a type of geirus and the cheftzah of the ben noach is affected. Rav Asher Weiss in Minchas Asher brings many of the ra'ayos of the Mishnas Ya'avetz (but he doesn't quote the Mishans Ya'avetz so presumably they are his own ra'ayos as well) and then shows how they are not ra'ayos.
The nafka mina would be could a ger toshav be chozer and are his children geiri toshav. The Brisker Rav writes explicitly that a ger toshav can be chozer by not keeping the mitzvos since it is not a real geirus and jsut a kabbalah.
If it is a real geirus then the children should also be geiri toshav
The Chazon Ish writes a ger toshav can be chozer but he also says the small children of a ger toshav are geiri toshav. This seems to be a bit of a stirah. (Although tzarich iyun why davka the small children and not all children)
Note: Due to the nature of this topic I am being m'katzeir and providing mareh m'komos. v'hameivin yavin. (If you can convince me that I am being overly sensitive I will provide greater detail).
The gemara in Avodah Zara (65b) brings a machlokes in understanding what makes a ben noach into a ger toshav. The Rambam (Hil Avodas Kochavim perek 10 and Hil Issurei Biah 14:7) paskens like the chachamim that a ger toshav is a ben noach who accepts on himself in from of a beis din that he will keep the 7 mitzvos b'nei noach. The Rambam also adds (Issurei Biah and in Melachim Perek 8) that one who accepts on himself to be a ger toshav is from the chasidei umos ha'olam and gets olam haba. However, if a ben noach keeps the 7 mitzvos on his own then he does not get the special status of a ger toshav.
The Ritva in Makkos (9B) also writes something similar ayin sham. A ger toshav is a metzuvah v'oseh and a ben noach is aino metzuvah v'oseh.
In terms of what special laws apply to a ger toshav, ayin the Chazon Ish Baba Kama Siman 10:16.
The Brisker Rav (mechtavim in Chiddushei HaGriz, last letter) explains that the status of ger toshav was created after mattan torah and he bases this on the gemara Baba Kama 38a and the Ritva mentioned above.
The lomdus boils down to whether it is a real geirus or just a kabbalah in beis din. The Brisker Rav feels it is just a kabbalah to keep teh 7 mitzvos and it brings with it certain dinim. The Mishans Ya'avetz (Y.D. Siman 3) brings many ra,ayos to show it is a type of geirus and the cheftzah of the ben noach is affected. Rav Asher Weiss in Minchas Asher brings many of the ra'ayos of the Mishnas Ya'avetz (but he doesn't quote the Mishans Ya'avetz so presumably they are his own ra'ayos as well) and then shows how they are not ra'ayos.
The nafka mina would be could a ger toshav be chozer and are his children geiri toshav. The Brisker Rav writes explicitly that a ger toshav can be chozer by not keeping the mitzvos since it is not a real geirus and jsut a kabbalah.
If it is a real geirus then the children should also be geiri toshav
The Chazon Ish writes a ger toshav can be chozer but he also says the small children of a ger toshav are geiri toshav. This seems to be a bit of a stirah. (Although tzarich iyun why davka the small children and not all children)
Friday, October 27, 2006
Techiyas Hameisim and Noach
The thought occurred to me last week, what will be the status of Adam and Noach after techiyas hameisim. When it comes to the Avos and Shevatim, one could get into the whole discussion whether they have a status of Yisroel or not. (ayin Parshas Derachim). However, everyone agrees that Adam and Noach do not have the status of Yisroel. Will they need to be m'gayeir after techiyas hameisim, will it be optional ? Just wondering.
Parshas Beraishis:The Mitzvah of Peru U'revu
Last Shabbos I gave my chaburah on the obligation of peru u'revu. I mainly focused on whether women and b'nei noach are obligated in this mitzvah. I have already written about this topic over here, so I won't add much. I will just add that I believe the lomdus is based on how one understands the nature of "lo tohu bera'a, lasheves yatzarah". Is this an independent mitzvah besides the mitzvah of peru u'revu, or is it part of peru u'revu and is the reason why peru u'revu is a mitzvah rabba.
One nafka mina would be if someone already was m'kayeim peru u'revu, would there still be a mitzvah of "lo tohu bera'a, lasheves yatzarah". If they are two independent mitzvos, then one could argue you still get a mitzvah for having more kids.
Another nafkah mina would be that even though women and b'nei noach don't have a chiyuv of peru u'revu they still might have a chiyuiv of "lo tohu bera'a, lasheves yatzarah"
This seems to be a machlokes rishonim. Tosafos in Gittin 41b asks 'why did the gemara say you must free an eved because of "lo tohu bera'a, lasheves yatzarah" , why don't we say we should free the eved so he can be m'kayeim the mitzvah of peru u'revu? Tosafos gives 3 answers., one of them being that an eved has a chiyuv to have children because of "lo tohu bera'a, lasheves yatzarah". The Chasam Sofer understands all 3 answers of Tosafos as saying that "lo tohu bera'a, lasheves yatzarah" is an independent mitzvah from peru u'revu. Others like the Chelkas M'chokeik in Even Ezer Siman 1, learn it is a machlokes within the answers of Tosafos.
Tosafos in Chagiga 2b seems to learn it is all one mitzvah.
I think one can possibly be m'dayeik in the Rambam that he holds "lo tohu bera'a" is part of the mitzvah of peru u'revu. The Rambam paskens that a women is patur from peru u'revu. If lo tohu bera'a, lasheves yatzarah is an independent mitzvah, shouldn't he write that women are chayav because of this reason? Furthermore, the Rambam writes that even if you have been m'kayeim peru u'revu, there is a mitzvah m'divrei sofrim to have more children in order to bring more Jews into the world. Why didn't the Rambam write it is a mitzvah because of lo tohu bera'a, lasheves yatzarah? Possibly, the Rambam held lo tohu bera'a, lasheves yatzarah is part of peru u'revu.
One nafka mina would be if someone already was m'kayeim peru u'revu, would there still be a mitzvah of "lo tohu bera'a, lasheves yatzarah". If they are two independent mitzvos, then one could argue you still get a mitzvah for having more kids.
Another nafkah mina would be that even though women and b'nei noach don't have a chiyuv of peru u'revu they still might have a chiyuiv of "lo tohu bera'a, lasheves yatzarah"
This seems to be a machlokes rishonim. Tosafos in Gittin 41b asks 'why did the gemara say you must free an eved because of "lo tohu bera'a, lasheves yatzarah" , why don't we say we should free the eved so he can be m'kayeim the mitzvah of peru u'revu? Tosafos gives 3 answers., one of them being that an eved has a chiyuv to have children because of "lo tohu bera'a, lasheves yatzarah". The Chasam Sofer understands all 3 answers of Tosafos as saying that "lo tohu bera'a, lasheves yatzarah" is an independent mitzvah from peru u'revu. Others like the Chelkas M'chokeik in Even Ezer Siman 1, learn it is a machlokes within the answers of Tosafos.
Tosafos in Chagiga 2b seems to learn it is all one mitzvah.
I think one can possibly be m'dayeik in the Rambam that he holds "lo tohu bera'a" is part of the mitzvah of peru u'revu. The Rambam paskens that a women is patur from peru u'revu. If lo tohu bera'a, lasheves yatzarah is an independent mitzvah, shouldn't he write that women are chayav because of this reason? Furthermore, the Rambam writes that even if you have been m'kayeim peru u'revu, there is a mitzvah m'divrei sofrim to have more children in order to bring more Jews into the world. Why didn't the Rambam write it is a mitzvah because of lo tohu bera'a, lasheves yatzarah? Possibly, the Rambam held lo tohu bera'a, lasheves yatzarah is part of peru u'revu.
Tuesday, October 17, 2006
Shailos and Torah From Yom Tov I
I hope everyone had a nice Yom Tov. Over Yom Tov I heard some interesting divrei torah and soem interesting halachic shailahs. I will try and write about them in the next few days.
Shailah I:
This year, Shimini Atzeres was Shabbos and Simchas Torah fell out on a Sunday. This raised the interesting question of whether one would be allowed to move the lichter from the sukkah into the house on Motzei Shabos. The issue is that the lichter was muktzah the whole Shabbos, including bein hashemoshos Shabbos evening. We have a klal that something that is muktzeh during bein hashemoshos is muktzeh the whole day. Therefore, why don't we say that since the lichter was muktzah during bein hashemoshos on Erev Simchas Torah, it is muktzah the whole Simchas Torah and one can not move it until after Simchas Torah.
The answer is actually pretty simple and is a b'feirush Tosafos in Beitzah (Daf 6 and 30). Tosafos says a klal that we don't say "migo l'yom sh'avar". In other words we don't say that if something is muktzah bein hashemoshos due to the previous day that it is muktzeh teh next day as well. Therefore, in this case the lichter is only muktzah bein hashemoshos because of Shabbos and therefore would not be muktzah on Sunday, Simchas Torah.
What is more interesting is some of the discussions in the achronim regarding this topic.
Rav Akiva Eiger (Siman 6) brings to proofs to this Tosafos. He writes that at one point it was possible for YomKippur to fall out on Friday. If we didn't say "migo l'yom sh'avar" then we should say that the food is muktzah bein hashemoshos of Friday evening and then it would be muktzah the next day on Shabbos. How would it ever be possible to eat on Shabbos? From here you see we don't say "migo l'yom sh'avar".
Another nafka mina that Rabbi Akiva Eiger brings is when Shabbos is the day after Pesach. Can one eat chametz on that Shabbos. Again, since we don't say "migo l'yom sh'avar", the chametz would not be muktzah on Shabbos.
The Shemiras Shabbos (Perek 22 very end of footmote 1) does bring a case where there is a problem. When the lichter is still lit bein hashemoshos of Friday evening (eg. a yartzeit candle) , he quotes Rav Shlomo Zalman as saying it could be muktzah on Shabbos. The sevara to say it is assur is because it would be similar to a sukkah on the eigth day Sukos. Tosafos writes (Beitzah 30) that even though we don't say "migo l'yom sh'avar", since one has a chiyuv to sit in the sukkah bein hashemoshos because it might be Sukkos, the sukkah is muktzah. The yartzeit candle could be similar to this case however, the Shmiras Shabbos leaves it a s a tzarich iyun. ayin sham.
Another interesting mareh mokom on this sugyah is the Kehilas Yaakov in Beitzah Siman 2.
Shailah I:
This year, Shimini Atzeres was Shabbos and Simchas Torah fell out on a Sunday. This raised the interesting question of whether one would be allowed to move the lichter from the sukkah into the house on Motzei Shabos. The issue is that the lichter was muktzah the whole Shabbos, including bein hashemoshos Shabbos evening. We have a klal that something that is muktzeh during bein hashemoshos is muktzeh the whole day. Therefore, why don't we say that since the lichter was muktzah during bein hashemoshos on Erev Simchas Torah, it is muktzah the whole Simchas Torah and one can not move it until after Simchas Torah.
The answer is actually pretty simple and is a b'feirush Tosafos in Beitzah (Daf 6 and 30). Tosafos says a klal that we don't say "migo l'yom sh'avar". In other words we don't say that if something is muktzah bein hashemoshos due to the previous day that it is muktzeh teh next day as well. Therefore, in this case the lichter is only muktzah bein hashemoshos because of Shabbos and therefore would not be muktzah on Sunday, Simchas Torah.
What is more interesting is some of the discussions in the achronim regarding this topic.
Rav Akiva Eiger (Siman 6) brings to proofs to this Tosafos. He writes that at one point it was possible for YomKippur to fall out on Friday. If we didn't say "migo l'yom sh'avar" then we should say that the food is muktzah bein hashemoshos of Friday evening and then it would be muktzah the next day on Shabbos. How would it ever be possible to eat on Shabbos? From here you see we don't say "migo l'yom sh'avar".
Another nafka mina that Rabbi Akiva Eiger brings is when Shabbos is the day after Pesach. Can one eat chametz on that Shabbos. Again, since we don't say "migo l'yom sh'avar", the chametz would not be muktzah on Shabbos.
The Shemiras Shabbos (Perek 22 very end of footmote 1) does bring a case where there is a problem. When the lichter is still lit bein hashemoshos of Friday evening (eg. a yartzeit candle) , he quotes Rav Shlomo Zalman as saying it could be muktzah on Shabbos. The sevara to say it is assur is because it would be similar to a sukkah on the eigth day Sukos. Tosafos writes (Beitzah 30) that even though we don't say "migo l'yom sh'avar", since one has a chiyuv to sit in the sukkah bein hashemoshos because it might be Sukkos, the sukkah is muktzah. The yartzeit candle could be similar to this case however, the Shmiras Shabbos leaves it a s a tzarich iyun. ayin sham.
Another interesting mareh mokom on this sugyah is the Kehilas Yaakov in Beitzah Siman 2.
Thursday, October 05, 2006
Making A Koton Pay A Fine
I recently heard of a story where a teacher disciplined the children in her class by making them pay a quarter when they did something wrong. Without getting into a discussion whether this make sense from a chinuch perspective, I was wondering if one could do this al pi halacha. Can one k'nas a koton and make them pay money. I was also wondering if it could be tied to inyanei d'yoma regarding the machlokes whether a koton can be makneh a lulav.
Anyone have any thoughts.
(Note: I really am not interested in discussing whether this is good chinuch so I respectfully ask that no comments be posted regarding that area. Thank you.)
Anyone have any thoughts.
(Note: I really am not interested in discussing whether this is good chinuch so I respectfully ask that no comments be posted regarding that area. Thank you.)
Thursday, September 28, 2006
Issur Melacha and Issur Achila On Yom Kippur II
One more interesting he'arah on this topic.
Rav Shirkin in the Harirei Kedem (Siman 49) brings a Beis HaLevi (Chelek 1 Siman 18) that jsut like if one does melacha on Shabbos he is a mumar l'kol hatorah so too if one does melacha on Yom Kippur he is a mumar l'kol hatorah. (The rayah is from the Rambam Hil Geirushin 3:19 that if one who writes a get on Shabbos or Yom Kippur the get is batul and the kesef mishna explains because he is like an akum). Rav Shirkin then writes that Rav Moshe Soloveitchik added that since the issur achila and issur melacha of Yom Kippur comes from the same kedushas hayom, then just like if one does melacha on Yom Kippur he is a mumar l'kol hatorah, so too if one eats on Yom Kippur he is also a mumar l'kol hatorah.
Rav Shirkin asks on this Beis HaLevi, why is this whole idea true. B'shlama by one who does melacha on Shabbos, we can understand why you are a mumar l'kol hatorah because as the Rambam writes in Hil Shabbos (30:15) Shabbos is an os that HKBH created the world. However, what kind of os is represented by Yom Kippur? He leaves it as a tzarich iyun.
The Mesoras HaRav Machzor actually brings down this exact question on the Beis HaLevi and gives the following answer. The Rav compares Yom Kippur to Shabbas. Why is Yom Kippur called "shabbos shabboson". The Rav explained that whereas Shabbos represents the idea that HKBH created the world thru middas hadin, Yom Kippur represents the idea that the world is created thru middas hachesed. The medrash says that the "yom echad" in the possuk "vayehi erev vayehi boker yom echad" refers to Yom Kippur. Teshuva was created before the world and is a necessary component in sustaining the world. This is why keeping one who violates Yom Kippur is a mumar l'kol hatorah. Yom Kippur also represents a fundemental idea about HKBH and the creation of the world, just like Shabbos.
Rav Shirkin in the Harirei Kedem (Siman 49) brings a Beis HaLevi (Chelek 1 Siman 18) that jsut like if one does melacha on Shabbos he is a mumar l'kol hatorah so too if one does melacha on Yom Kippur he is a mumar l'kol hatorah. (The rayah is from the Rambam Hil Geirushin 3:19 that if one who writes a get on Shabbos or Yom Kippur the get is batul and the kesef mishna explains because he is like an akum). Rav Shirkin then writes that Rav Moshe Soloveitchik added that since the issur achila and issur melacha of Yom Kippur comes from the same kedushas hayom, then just like if one does melacha on Yom Kippur he is a mumar l'kol hatorah, so too if one eats on Yom Kippur he is also a mumar l'kol hatorah.
Rav Shirkin asks on this Beis HaLevi, why is this whole idea true. B'shlama by one who does melacha on Shabbos, we can understand why you are a mumar l'kol hatorah because as the Rambam writes in Hil Shabbos (30:15) Shabbos is an os that HKBH created the world. However, what kind of os is represented by Yom Kippur? He leaves it as a tzarich iyun.
The Mesoras HaRav Machzor actually brings down this exact question on the Beis HaLevi and gives the following answer. The Rav compares Yom Kippur to Shabbas. Why is Yom Kippur called "shabbos shabboson". The Rav explained that whereas Shabbos represents the idea that HKBH created the world thru middas hadin, Yom Kippur represents the idea that the world is created thru middas hachesed. The medrash says that the "yom echad" in the possuk "vayehi erev vayehi boker yom echad" refers to Yom Kippur. Teshuva was created before the world and is a necessary component in sustaining the world. This is why keeping one who violates Yom Kippur is a mumar l'kol hatorah. Yom Kippur also represents a fundemental idea about HKBH and the creation of the world, just like Shabbos.
Issur Melacha and Issur Achila On Yom Kippur
I saw an interesting chiddush in the Mesoros HaRav Machzor, the new machzor just published that contains the torah thoughts of Rav Soloveitchik about Yom Kippur.
The Rav writes that we find in the piyutim that Rabbi Eliezer HaKalir refers to Yom Kippur by three names: a)Yom Kippurim b) Tzom HaAsiri c) Shabbas Shabboson. However, the Rambam in Hil Shivisas Asar only refers to two names a) Yom Kippurim b) Shivisas Asar. The Rambam seems to fuse the names Tzom HaAsiri and Shabbas Shabboson into one name. The Rav explains that the machlokes between Rav Eliezer HaKalir and the Rambam is how to understand the nature of the issur of eating and drinking on Yom Kippur. The Rambam holds that it falls under the same issur as doing melacha. Therefore, he fuses the name Tzom HaAsiri which represents the issur achila with the name Shabbas Shabboson which represents the issur melacha.
Interestingly (although not surprising) , Rav Shirkin in Harirei Kedem (Siman 49) says the exact same thing although he doesn't bring it as a machlokes between the Rambam and Rabbi Eliezer HaKalir and he doesn't mention the point of calling Yom Kippur, Tzom HaAsiri. Also, Rav Shirkin writes that the Rav heard this idea either from Rav Chaim or Rav Moshe Soloveitchik. The way Rav Shirkin brings it is that the issur achila comes from the same kedushas hayom as the issur melacha.
The rayah to this comes from the Rambam in Hil Avodas Yom Kippurim (3:7). The Rambam writes that the shaliach responsible for taking the Azazael to the midbar can eat if he feels weak. The Rambam is mashma that we don't require that the shalaich be in a matzav of pikuach nefesh, but only that he feels weak. How does the Rambam know this? Based on the above yesod, we can understand this halacha. The issur achila of Yom Kippur comes from the same kedushas hayom as the issur melacha. Therefore, just like you can do melacha for the avodas hayom, you can also eat to enable you to complete the avodas hayom.
The above rayah is found in both the machzor and in Harirei Kedem. Rav Shirkin adds in another rayah from the fact that the Rambam writes (Shevisas Asar 1:5) that the mitzva to refrain from eating and drinking comes from the possuk "shabbos shabboson". The mitzvah of shabbson implies a mitzvah to keep the kedushas hayom and the same kedushas hayom that assurs melacha also assurs eating and drinking. Therefore, we can learn out issur achilah from "shabbos shabboson"
The Rav writes that we find in the piyutim that Rabbi Eliezer HaKalir refers to Yom Kippur by three names: a)Yom Kippurim b) Tzom HaAsiri c) Shabbas Shabboson. However, the Rambam in Hil Shivisas Asar only refers to two names a) Yom Kippurim b) Shivisas Asar. The Rambam seems to fuse the names Tzom HaAsiri and Shabbas Shabboson into one name. The Rav explains that the machlokes between Rav Eliezer HaKalir and the Rambam is how to understand the nature of the issur of eating and drinking on Yom Kippur. The Rambam holds that it falls under the same issur as doing melacha. Therefore, he fuses the name Tzom HaAsiri which represents the issur achila with the name Shabbas Shabboson which represents the issur melacha.
Interestingly (although not surprising) , Rav Shirkin in Harirei Kedem (Siman 49) says the exact same thing although he doesn't bring it as a machlokes between the Rambam and Rabbi Eliezer HaKalir and he doesn't mention the point of calling Yom Kippur, Tzom HaAsiri. Also, Rav Shirkin writes that the Rav heard this idea either from Rav Chaim or Rav Moshe Soloveitchik. The way Rav Shirkin brings it is that the issur achila comes from the same kedushas hayom as the issur melacha.
The rayah to this comes from the Rambam in Hil Avodas Yom Kippurim (3:7). The Rambam writes that the shaliach responsible for taking the Azazael to the midbar can eat if he feels weak. The Rambam is mashma that we don't require that the shalaich be in a matzav of pikuach nefesh, but only that he feels weak. How does the Rambam know this? Based on the above yesod, we can understand this halacha. The issur achila of Yom Kippur comes from the same kedushas hayom as the issur melacha. Therefore, just like you can do melacha for the avodas hayom, you can also eat to enable you to complete the avodas hayom.
The above rayah is found in both the machzor and in Harirei Kedem. Rav Shirkin adds in another rayah from the fact that the Rambam writes (Shevisas Asar 1:5) that the mitzva to refrain from eating and drinking comes from the possuk "shabbos shabboson". The mitzvah of shabbson implies a mitzvah to keep the kedushas hayom and the same kedushas hayom that assurs melacha also assurs eating and drinking. Therefore, we can learn out issur achilah from "shabbos shabboson"
Tuesday, September 26, 2006
Teshuva For Violating An Issur M'D'Rabanan
Must one do teshuva for doing an aveirah that is only m'd'rabanan? The Gevuras Yitzchak in his sefer on Yomim Noraim brings down A Nesivos in Siman 234:3 that one is not punished for violaing an issur d'rabanan b'shogeg. Thereforfe, the Nesivos writes that you don't need teshuva or a kapparah.
The Rambam in Hil Teshuva (1:1) writes "kol mitzvos sheh'b'torah" require teshuva. The question is, can one be m'dayeik in this Rambam in favor of or against the Nesivos. The Gevuros Yitzchak writes that on the one hand "kol mitzvos sheh'b'torah" could imply only issurim m'd'oreisa (like the Nesivos) . However, if that is true the Rambam should write that an issur d'rabanan b'meizid does require teshuva.
One could also say that the Rambam really holds like the Nesivos and he is l'shitaso that by violating a d'rabanan you are oveir on an aseh of "asisa k'chol asher yorucha" and a lav of "lo sasur" (ayin Hil Mamrim 1:2). Therefore, when the Rambam writes "kol mitzvos sheh'b'torah", he is including even an issur d'rabanan. But again according to the Nesivos the Rambam should write that issurei d'rabanan b'shogeg don't require teshuva.
The Rambam in Hil Teshuva (1:1) writes "kol mitzvos sheh'b'torah" require teshuva. The question is, can one be m'dayeik in this Rambam in favor of or against the Nesivos. The Gevuros Yitzchak writes that on the one hand "kol mitzvos sheh'b'torah" could imply only issurim m'd'oreisa (like the Nesivos) . However, if that is true the Rambam should write that an issur d'rabanan b'meizid does require teshuva.
One could also say that the Rambam really holds like the Nesivos and he is l'shitaso that by violating a d'rabanan you are oveir on an aseh of "asisa k'chol asher yorucha" and a lav of "lo sasur" (ayin Hil Mamrim 1:2). Therefore, when the Rambam writes "kol mitzvos sheh'b'torah", he is including even an issur d'rabanan. But again according to the Nesivos the Rambam should write that issurei d'rabanan b'shogeg don't require teshuva.
Friday, September 22, 2006
Kesiva V'Chasima Tova
I just want to wish everyone a kesiva v'chasima tova. Thank you for visiting my blog and reading my divrei torah. We should all be zocheh to have a healthy year and grow in torah, avoda and yiras shamayim.
Monday, September 18, 2006
Parshas Nitzavim-VaYeilech:Davening At A Cemetary
This weeks shiur was on the sugyah of davening at a cemetary. The Shulchan Aruch brings down the inyan of davening at a cemetary in 3 places. In Hilchos Ta'anis it is quoted as one of the halachos that a tzibbur should do when there is a ta'anis for rain. It is also mentioned in Hil' Tisha B'Av and finally in Hilchos Rosh Hashana. Although everyone agrees one should or could go to a cemetary there is a machlokes about why we are going.
The gemara in Ta'anis 16A brings two reasons why we go to a cemetary on a fast day. One opinion holds it is to arouse in ourselves a feeling of teshuva by saying that if we don't do teshuva we are like meisim. The 2nd opinion is that we are davening to the meisim that they should intercede on our behalf. The gemara says the nafka mina is whether one should go to a non-Jewish cemetary if no other cemetary is available. Acc. to the first reason one could go but not according to the 2nd reason. Tosafos writes from here we have a minhag to go to the cemetary on Tisha B'Av.
Also the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch seem to pasken like the first reason (to arouse in ourselves a feeling of teshuva).
Davening To Meisim
PLEASE NOTE: JUST TO MAKE SURE THERE IS NO CONFUSION, WHEN I WRITE "DAVENING TO MEISIM" WHAT I MEAN IS DAVENING TO A MEIS AND ASKING THE MEIS TO INTERCEDE ON OUR BEHALF. I DO NOT MEAN THAT WE ARE DAVENING TO A MEIS SO THAT THE MEIS WILL FULLFILL OUR REQUEST. ONLY HKBH CAN DO THIS.
Shittas HaMachmirim
The question is, is there anything wrong with davening to the meisim. The Bach (end of Y.D. 217) brings a shittah that it is assur to daven to a meis and to do so is a violation of "doresh el hameisim". The Be'er Heitev in Hil Rosh Hashanah (581:17) also quotes a Maharil who holds it is assur and the only reason to go to a cemetary is because it is a mokom kodosh v'tahor. Teh Maharil writes that a person is only allowed to daven to Hashem and not to any other intemediary. The Bach also points out that even though we find that Kaleiv davened in Chevron by the Ma'aras HaMachpeila (Sotah 34b) he wasn't davening to the avos. Rather, since a cemetary is a mokom kodosh v'tahor it is a place where ones tefillos will be readily accepted.
Shittas HaMeikilim
There are poskim who hold that it is muttar to daven to meisim. It should be pointed out that there is a similar machlokes regarding davening to ma'lachim (eg. machnisiei rachamim in selichos). However, as we will see one can be m'chaleik between davening to a meis and davening to a malach. The Maharam Shik (O.C. 293) writes that it is muttar. He asks how is it possible to ask a living tzaddik to daven for us? He answers that when the tzaddik hears our problems the tzaddik himself is in paon. Therefore the tzaddik is really davening that HKBH should help him (i.e. the tzaddik). It just happens to be that the way to ease the tzaddik's pain is by helping the other person. This sevara would apply to a meis as well. The meisim know what is going on in this world and when they hear we are in pain they will also be in pain. Therefore, they can ask HKBH to heal their pain (i.e. the pain of the meis) and m'meilah the pain of the other person will also be healed. Although the Maharam Shik doesn't mention it, I saw brought down in the Minchas Yitzchak (Chelek 8 Siman 53) that this idea is found in the Chasam Sofer (O.C. 166) who was actually the rebbi of the Maharam Shik. The Chasam Sofer used this sevara to distinguish between davening to malachim (which he held was asasur) and davening to a live person (which is muttar) . It seems the Maharam Shik took itone step further and applied it to meisim as well.
The Minchas Elazer (Chelek 1 Siman 68) has a lengthy teshuva why it is muttar. He quotes many gemaras and medrashim as proofs. Rav Moshe (Igros Moshe O.C. chelek 5 Siman 43:6)
also discusses this issue. However, Rav Moshe doesn't seem to come out with a final psak. He just says that the machlokes is based on whether meisim are better than malachim.
I would like to say that maybe we have a rayah that Rabbi Akiva Eiger held it was muttar. In Hil Rosh Hashana the Magan Avraham writes that the minhag to go to a cemetary is found in the gemara. But he doesn't say which gemara. The GR"A points you to the gemara in Ta'anis. However, Rabbi Akiva Eiger says that the MG"A is referring to the gemara in Sotah about Kaleiv. Why did Rabbi Akiva Eiger choose this gemara? It could be that Rabbi Akiva Eiger held it was muttar to daven to meisim and therefore he chose the gemara in Sotah which clearly states it is muttar (unless you learn like the Bach that it was a din in the mokom).
One more mareh mokom to look at (which I didn't get a chance to see) is an article in Techumim vol 21 by Rav Moshe Tzuriel. (also see here at the end of the article)
The gemara in Ta'anis 16A brings two reasons why we go to a cemetary on a fast day. One opinion holds it is to arouse in ourselves a feeling of teshuva by saying that if we don't do teshuva we are like meisim. The 2nd opinion is that we are davening to the meisim that they should intercede on our behalf. The gemara says the nafka mina is whether one should go to a non-Jewish cemetary if no other cemetary is available. Acc. to the first reason one could go but not according to the 2nd reason. Tosafos writes from here we have a minhag to go to the cemetary on Tisha B'Av.
Also the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch seem to pasken like the first reason (to arouse in ourselves a feeling of teshuva).
Davening To Meisim
PLEASE NOTE: JUST TO MAKE SURE THERE IS NO CONFUSION, WHEN I WRITE "DAVENING TO MEISIM" WHAT I MEAN IS DAVENING TO A MEIS AND ASKING THE MEIS TO INTERCEDE ON OUR BEHALF. I DO NOT MEAN THAT WE ARE DAVENING TO A MEIS SO THAT THE MEIS WILL FULLFILL OUR REQUEST. ONLY HKBH CAN DO THIS.
Shittas HaMachmirim
The question is, is there anything wrong with davening to the meisim. The Bach (end of Y.D. 217) brings a shittah that it is assur to daven to a meis and to do so is a violation of "doresh el hameisim". The Be'er Heitev in Hil Rosh Hashanah (581:17) also quotes a Maharil who holds it is assur and the only reason to go to a cemetary is because it is a mokom kodosh v'tahor. Teh Maharil writes that a person is only allowed to daven to Hashem and not to any other intemediary. The Bach also points out that even though we find that Kaleiv davened in Chevron by the Ma'aras HaMachpeila (Sotah 34b) he wasn't davening to the avos. Rather, since a cemetary is a mokom kodosh v'tahor it is a place where ones tefillos will be readily accepted.
Shittas HaMeikilim
There are poskim who hold that it is muttar to daven to meisim. It should be pointed out that there is a similar machlokes regarding davening to ma'lachim (eg. machnisiei rachamim in selichos). However, as we will see one can be m'chaleik between davening to a meis and davening to a malach. The Maharam Shik (O.C. 293) writes that it is muttar. He asks how is it possible to ask a living tzaddik to daven for us? He answers that when the tzaddik hears our problems the tzaddik himself is in paon. Therefore the tzaddik is really davening that HKBH should help him (i.e. the tzaddik). It just happens to be that the way to ease the tzaddik's pain is by helping the other person. This sevara would apply to a meis as well. The meisim know what is going on in this world and when they hear we are in pain they will also be in pain. Therefore, they can ask HKBH to heal their pain (i.e. the pain of the meis) and m'meilah the pain of the other person will also be healed. Although the Maharam Shik doesn't mention it, I saw brought down in the Minchas Yitzchak (Chelek 8 Siman 53) that this idea is found in the Chasam Sofer (O.C. 166) who was actually the rebbi of the Maharam Shik. The Chasam Sofer used this sevara to distinguish between davening to malachim (which he held was asasur) and davening to a live person (which is muttar) . It seems the Maharam Shik took itone step further and applied it to meisim as well.
The Minchas Elazer (Chelek 1 Siman 68) has a lengthy teshuva why it is muttar. He quotes many gemaras and medrashim as proofs. Rav Moshe (Igros Moshe O.C. chelek 5 Siman 43:6)
also discusses this issue. However, Rav Moshe doesn't seem to come out with a final psak. He just says that the machlokes is based on whether meisim are better than malachim.
I would like to say that maybe we have a rayah that Rabbi Akiva Eiger held it was muttar. In Hil Rosh Hashana the Magan Avraham writes that the minhag to go to a cemetary is found in the gemara. But he doesn't say which gemara. The GR"A points you to the gemara in Ta'anis. However, Rabbi Akiva Eiger says that the MG"A is referring to the gemara in Sotah about Kaleiv. Why did Rabbi Akiva Eiger choose this gemara? It could be that Rabbi Akiva Eiger held it was muttar to daven to meisim and therefore he chose the gemara in Sotah which clearly states it is muttar (unless you learn like the Bach that it was a din in the mokom).
One more mareh mokom to look at (which I didn't get a chance to see) is an article in Techumim vol 21 by Rav Moshe Tzuriel. (also see here at the end of the article)
Friday, August 25, 2006
Lo Sasur II
The Derashos HaRan (in Derasha 5,7 and 12) discusses the issur of "lo sasur". Interestingly, he seems to say the same idea as R' Elchanan but in a slightly different manner. The Ran writes that the koach to decide halacha was given to the chachamim and the halacha follows the majority. This is learnt from the passuk "acharei rabim l'hatos". In other words the obligation to listen to a majority consensus is based on this possuk. Then in the same sentence the Ran equates this obligation with the issur of "lo sasur". However, the Ran understands "lo sasur" as only applying to derashos and gezeiros decided by the Sanhedrin in the Beis HaMikdash. It would seem that both R' Elchanan and the Ran hold there are 2 dinim. One obligation is to listen to the Sanhedrin which is based on "lo sasur". The other obligation is to listen to the majority. The Ran learns this from "acharei rabim l'hatos" and R' Elchanan learns it is part of lo sasur.
Am I reading to much in to the Ran or is my understanding correct?
Am I reading to much in to the Ran or is my understanding correct?
Wednesday, August 23, 2006
Lo Sasur-When Can One Argue
My good friend Chaim Brown has posted about Lo Sasur on his blog over here . In looking up the Rav Elchanan (Kuntres Divrei Sofrim 1:35-39) that he quoted, I noticed another Rav Elchanan that was also interesting. R' Elchanan in Siman 2 discusses how is it possible to argue on a psak if there is an issur of "lo sasur". R' Elchanan explains based on the Rambam in his intorduction to the Yad and the Rambam in the beginning of Hilchos Mamrim that there are two qualifications for a psak to be included in "lo sasur". The first is mefurash in the Rambam in Hichos Mamrim that it has to be a psak coming from the Sanhedrin located in the Beis HaMikdash. (Exactly what type of psak is a different question all together, and maybe I will discuss it later). The second qualification is that if teh majority of the chachamim decide a halacha then one is not allowed to go against it. The source for this is based on the loshon of the Rambam in his hakdamah to the Yad. R' Elchanan then adds that with this we can explain why the amoraim were not allowed to argue on the tanaim. (This is the Kesef Mishna's question in Hil Mamrim Perek 3). Since the chasimas hamishna was established by rov chachamim, it comes out that to argue on the mishna would be a violation of lo sasur. The same reasoning would explain why we can no longer argue on teh gemara after the chasimas hatalmud.
Thursday, August 17, 2006
Kedushas Beis Keneses
The gemarah in Megilla (Daf 26-27) discusses the laws behind selling a shul. The question addressed in the Rishonim is what kind of kedusha does a shul actually have. The Ramban (brought in the Ran) holds that a shul doesn't have any intrinsic kedusha. It is considered tashmishei kedusha like a lulav and sukkah. Once people decide that they no longer want to use the shul, it loses it's status of tashmishei kedusha. The Ran on the other hand understands that a shul does have kedusha which can't be taken away without some type of pidyon.
There are several nafka mina between the 2 shittos.
1) The status of the money: Everyone agrees that the money you received has some sort of kedusha the only question is why. The Ramban understands that everything revolves around the da'as of the community. Once they decide they don't want to daven in a shul the shul loses any kedusha it has. However, this da'as does not extend fully to the money. Their da'as is that a lesser kedusha extends to the money. The Ran on the other hand holds that since the money is in effect a pidyon for the shul, there is kedusha on teh money. However, it is a "kedusha kilisha", a lesser kedusha since this money was never designated as a davar sh'b'kedusha.
Interestingly, both the MG"A and Taz in O.C. 153 hold that the money has no intrinsic kedusha.
2) The gemara says that if you sell a shul with "7 tuvei ha'ir b'ma'mad anshei ha'ir" then you can use the money for whatever you want. Once again the question is why. The Ramban understands that since you have "7 tuvei ha'ir b'ma'mad anshei ha'ir", this means that teh community does not want any form of kedusha to remain at all, even on the money. Since no kedusha remains you can use the money for whatever you want. The Ran understands the reason to be that it is a special halacha that with "7 tuvei ha'ir b'ma'mad anshei ha'ir" you can remove the kedusha from teh money without having to transfer it anywhere (kedusha paka b'k'di).
3) Giving a shul as a matana. The gemara brings a machlokes whether a shul can be given as a matana. The tzad that itis muttar is because you are getting some ha'na'ah by giving it away. The Ran understands this k'peshuto. Since you need to redeem the kedusha of a shul, in this case you are redeeming it with the hana'ah. Furthermore, we are dealing with a case where it was given with the consent of "7 tuvei ha'ir b'ma'mad anshei ha'ir". You need this p'rat because the hana'ah is going to chullin and is not remaining kodesh. The Ramban understands that you are actually getting some d'var mitzvah back and that is what causes the community to give it away. Also, you don't need "7 tuvei ha'ir b'ma'mad anshei ha'ir" since you only need "7 tuvei ha'ir b'ma'mad anshei ha'ir" to remove the kedusha from the money which doesn't apply here.
There are several nafka mina between the 2 shittos.
1) The status of the money: Everyone agrees that the money you received has some sort of kedusha the only question is why. The Ramban understands that everything revolves around the da'as of the community. Once they decide they don't want to daven in a shul the shul loses any kedusha it has. However, this da'as does not extend fully to the money. Their da'as is that a lesser kedusha extends to the money. The Ran on the other hand holds that since the money is in effect a pidyon for the shul, there is kedusha on teh money. However, it is a "kedusha kilisha", a lesser kedusha since this money was never designated as a davar sh'b'kedusha.
Interestingly, both the MG"A and Taz in O.C. 153 hold that the money has no intrinsic kedusha.
2) The gemara says that if you sell a shul with "7 tuvei ha'ir b'ma'mad anshei ha'ir" then you can use the money for whatever you want. Once again the question is why. The Ramban understands that since you have "7 tuvei ha'ir b'ma'mad anshei ha'ir", this means that teh community does not want any form of kedusha to remain at all, even on the money. Since no kedusha remains you can use the money for whatever you want. The Ran understands the reason to be that it is a special halacha that with "7 tuvei ha'ir b'ma'mad anshei ha'ir" you can remove the kedusha from teh money without having to transfer it anywhere (kedusha paka b'k'di).
3) Giving a shul as a matana. The gemara brings a machlokes whether a shul can be given as a matana. The tzad that itis muttar is because you are getting some ha'na'ah by giving it away. The Ran understands this k'peshuto. Since you need to redeem the kedusha of a shul, in this case you are redeeming it with the hana'ah. Furthermore, we are dealing with a case where it was given with the consent of "7 tuvei ha'ir b'ma'mad anshei ha'ir". You need this p'rat because the hana'ah is going to chullin and is not remaining kodesh. The Ramban understands that you are actually getting some d'var mitzvah back and that is what causes the community to give it away. Also, you don't need "7 tuvei ha'ir b'ma'mad anshei ha'ir" since you only need "7 tuvei ha'ir b'ma'mad anshei ha'ir" to remove the kedusha from the money which doesn't apply here.
Wednesday, August 02, 2006
Doing Laundry Motzei Tisha B'Av
Because Tisha B'Av falls out on a Thursday, we don't have to wait until chatzos 10 Av to bathe, do laundry and get a haircut because of kovod Shabbos. (see MG"A 558:1). The question is can one begin even Thursday night. I don't have time to go thru all teh mareh m'komos that I found so I'll just tell you to look at the Taz in 551:14 who brings a Tosfos that allows you to start washing and getting a haircut after chatzos of 9 Av! Although the Taz doesn't pasken like that Tosafos, nireh li that the Taz agrees to the sevara that once things are muttar l'kovod shabbos it doesn't have to wait until Friday morning. From here it would be mashma one could start Thursday night. The Piskei Teshuvos brings numerous poskim who all say you can start Thursday night.
However, before you fire up the washing machines there might be one caveat. The Shmiras Shabbos brings down from Rav Shlomo Zalman that the heter is due to kovod Shabbos. Therefore, only laundry needed for Shabbos can be done before chatzos on Friday. This might get into the question whether kovod Shabbos removes the whole "issur" of 10 Av or we just say that the issur is there but for a mitzvah (i.e. kovod Shabbos) it is muttar.
One could also ask whether even l'fi Rav Shlomo Zalman would one be allowed to mix weekday and Shabbos clothing in the same machine. M'sevara I would say no since it is not a tircha issue but a nihug aveilus issue.
L'ma'aseh I don't know what people do. I assume most people don't follow this psak of Rav Shlomo Zalman but I could be wrong. My Rav thought one could do all laundry not like Rav Shlomo Zalman.
However, before you fire up the washing machines there might be one caveat. The Shmiras Shabbos brings down from Rav Shlomo Zalman that the heter is due to kovod Shabbos. Therefore, only laundry needed for Shabbos can be done before chatzos on Friday. This might get into the question whether kovod Shabbos removes the whole "issur" of 10 Av or we just say that the issur is there but for a mitzvah (i.e. kovod Shabbos) it is muttar.
One could also ask whether even l'fi Rav Shlomo Zalman would one be allowed to mix weekday and Shabbos clothing in the same machine. M'sevara I would say no since it is not a tircha issue but a nihug aveilus issue.
L'ma'aseh I don't know what people do. I assume most people don't follow this psak of Rav Shlomo Zalman but I could be wrong. My Rav thought one could do all laundry not like Rav Shlomo Zalman.
Tuesday, August 01, 2006
Shabbos Chazon:HKBH's Watching Us
The Aish Kodesh (Rav Klonomous Kalman from Piaczena) asks why is the Shabbos called Shabbos Chazon? The obvious answer is that it is named for the haftorah, but this just leads to the question why is this Shabbos named for the haftorah. He answers that there are different madreigaos of nevuah. A nevuah that starts with "chazon" means that the navi actually saw the nevuah that he received as opposed to just hearing about it.
Seeing something has a much more powerful effect on a person than just hearing about something. That is why the amoraim said that they did not wish to see the chevlei moshiach because it would be too hard for them. What difference does it make if they saw it or not-they undoubtallyt were aware of what would happen during chevlei moshiach. If they could handle knowing about it why could they not handle seeing it. The Aish Kodesh answers that it is because seeing something has a much more powerful effect on a person than just knowing about something.
Shabbos Chazon represents the idea that the tzorus of golus will be seen. In other words, HKBH Himself will come down to see the tzorus and not just "hear" about it in shamayim. The result will be that HKBH will feel our pain more acutely and will be more affected by our tears. This will lead to HKBH having rachmanus on us and taking us out of this golus.
We have had a lot of pain over the years and it continues even today. May HKBH see our tzorus and feel our pain and bring the geulah shlaima b'korov.
Seeing something has a much more powerful effect on a person than just hearing about something. That is why the amoraim said that they did not wish to see the chevlei moshiach because it would be too hard for them. What difference does it make if they saw it or not-they undoubtallyt were aware of what would happen during chevlei moshiach. If they could handle knowing about it why could they not handle seeing it. The Aish Kodesh answers that it is because seeing something has a much more powerful effect on a person than just knowing about something.
Shabbos Chazon represents the idea that the tzorus of golus will be seen. In other words, HKBH Himself will come down to see the tzorus and not just "hear" about it in shamayim. The result will be that HKBH will feel our pain more acutely and will be more affected by our tears. This will lead to HKBH having rachmanus on us and taking us out of this golus.
We have had a lot of pain over the years and it continues even today. May HKBH see our tzorus and feel our pain and bring the geulah shlaima b'korov.
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